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ADDENDUM
PREFACE
The degree of continuity in this essay is far from being all 
that it should, but a common thread is discernible, namely the 
administrative arrangements devised to handle new town development, 
both in theory and in practice, and in particular, the means devised 
(or not devised) to ensure that new town developments (of all sorts) 
were integrated with wider strategic planning policies.
As study progressed, it emerged that new towns in Britain were 
at something of a cross-roads. The function of new towns in planning 
as a whole was being discussed between Government and interested 
parties. Accordingly, much of the essay is devoted to examining 
the case for new town and development corporation-type institutions 
and considering how the experience of the past suggests that they 
might be adapted for use in the future.
If any dedication is required, then it must be two-fold.
First, to Ebenezer Howard, a man more grievously misrepresented by 
his friends than by his opponents. And Secondly, to the Harley 
Committee whose study (given great prominence in this essay because 
it appears to me to have been so unjustly neglected elsewhere) is 
a model of incisive understanding and sound common sense, which^had 
it been found in so-called "planners*1, would have prevented much 
wasted time and effort, and many misguided initiatives.
VHP SHALL BUILD THE NEW TOWNS: THE PROGRESS OF THOUGHT
New town development in Britain as an element of public policy 
has a long history. New towns formed an important part of Edward I fs 
(military) regional policy; the planned village movement in Scotland 
between 1750 and 1830 was sustained by private landowners, and Smout (19^ )  
describes the movement in terms of their political role in the economic 
and social planning of the country. Interesting parallels can be drawn 
between the town development work of the British Fisheries Society and 
the Commissioners for the Forfeited Estates in the Highlands after 
1745f and the Development Corporation machinery of this century. Both 
were concerned with the creative urbanisation of overspill people - the 
first with "overspill" from subsistence agriculture, the second with 
overspill from congested cities. Both superseded the local government 
of the day by use of government development agencies, centrally-endowed 
public commissioners answereable to Parliament. Youngson (1972) gives 
a valuable account of the work of this early Highlands and Islands 
Development Board.
The various planned communities of the nineteenth century are no ^  
more than tied factory houses on a large enough scale to be given also 
the basic services of a settlement - they do not have the social and „ 
political attributes normally associated with urban settlements. So 
it is right at the turn of the century, with the publication of Ebenezer 
Howard*s (1899) ’’Tomorrow - a Peaceful Path to Heal Reform” that it 
becomes useful to look at new town tought on the question of administrative 
arrangements•
"Howard saw that there was no solution to the city’s problems 
within the existing framework of municipal administration 
because one of its greatest problems was the lack of 
economic and social and political relation to the surrounding
countryside •.• What Howard said about the relation 
of town and country within the garden city area is 
equally applicable to the entire business of city 
and regional planning: the administrative unit that 
is created must be capable of embracing both the 
urban and rural aspects of the regions• "
Mumford (1945) p* 55*
This quote at once confirms the intellectual scope of Howard’s work.
He wrote at a time when thirty years of continuous depression in agri­
culture had left rural society debilitated and impoverished. He saw the 
problems of urban and rural squalor as two aspects of malaise in the 
organisation of communities and the economy. This understanding was 
sadly not reflected in the 1947 Act, a situation which PAG attempted 
to remedy only in 1968. Howard has suffered from consistent superficial 
interpretation, but it is disappointing that in "Garden Cities of Tomorrow" 
his understanding is not formalised into an analysis of the administrative 
framework which might achieve the town and country planning which he 
advocated. By contrast, very precise suggestions about the finance and 
administration of the built up area are given, encouraging practical men 
to think in terms of building closely-bounded towns quite insulated 
from the surrounding country.
Howard’s ideal of a country-wide spread of Social Cities called 
for far more than the addition of a few new "municipalities": it would 
have called for a complete reform of local government boundaries, along 
the lines of city-regions disposed around town clusters, of some level 
or other. One can look upon the Radcliffe-M and proposals for England, ^  
and the new regional divisions in Scotland as attempting this form in 
the same conviction which Howard had, that town and country must be 
planned in a way that recognised the interdependence of their functions 
in a healthy system (in this case grouping around town clusters of a very 
high level in the hierarchy)•
Instead of tackling this, the model developed starts by assuming
the existence of a"municipality", and concentrates on demonstrating
the financial realism of the approach. The provision of intrastructures
and services is discussed in some detail, but in a chapter entitled
"Expenditures": who will provide the services is not an issue, the
question is whether the rate-rent revenues in prospect will meet the









Sewage Disposal (Howard 1902 pp. 81-88)
This leaves a "balance available for rates levied by local bodies within 
whose jurisdiction the estate is situated", but it is not clear why rates 
should be paid: the intention is to convey "and more to spare besides"• 
The list indicates the high degree of self-sufficiency which 
Garden City would display.
"It will be seen that the whole scheme of Garden City will 
make extremely few demands upon the resources of outside 
local authorities. Roads, sewers, schools, parks, 
libraries, etc., will be provided out of the funds of the 
new "municipality" ... (Howard 1902, p. 87)
The exceptions strike a very distant note:
"I do not however forget that there are some functions which 
such a voluntary organisation as a garden city could not 
take over, such as the police and the administration of 
the poor-law." (Howard 1902 p. 87)
but these are swiftly dealt with: Garden Oity will pay pensions, under­
take charitable work and maintain its own institutions. Its physical
conditions will not encourage criminality, and in any case Garden City 
will not be attractive to the criminal classes.^
Howard does devote a chapter to "Administration” but this is 
concerned with the detailed workings of the civic administration, 
departmental responsibilities, electoral procedures and so on. He took 
great care to defuse the issue of the degree of communal enterprise, 
asserting the value of a pragmatic approach - which provisions are best 
made privately, which publicly, decided by each municipality. (Howard, 
1902, Chs 6, 8).
Such a degree of self-sufficiency of course was quite realistic, 
given the nature of local government as it then existed. Consider 
the utilities on which Letchworth spent its money in the early years: 
in 1904, roads, drainage, waterworks; in 1905* a gasworks; in 1907 a 
power station and electricity supply.^ Of these, by 1946 not one was 
not provided by local government or statutory undertakers, and even ^  
with the enormous advantage of statutory foundation and central govern­
ment pressure for co-operatives, formed a potential source of disagreement
and delay. By contrast, the worst which Hitchin RDC could do to the
2
puny Letchworth was "look on the scheme with extreme distaste" , and 
decline to build houses.
In fact, although Letchworth might have been powerless by comparison 
with new towns under the 1946 Act, it operated in a different world, 
where its ability to pay determined what services it could provide.
As Howard observed
"The powers possessed by the Central Council (the Board of 
Management of Garden City) are, it may be noticed in passing, 
more ample than those possessed by other municipal bodies, 
for whilst most of them only enjoy such powers as are 
expressly conferred on them by Act of Parliament, the
1• See Purdom, 1963 p.28.
2. Ibid. p.22.
Central Council of Garden City exercises on behalf 
of the people those wider rights, powers and 
privileges which are enjoyed by landlords under 
common law ..." (Howard, 1902, p. )
"Garden City is in a greatly superior position, for 
by stepping as a quasi public body into the rights 
of a private landlord, it becomes at once clothed with 
far larger powers for carrying out the will of the ts'
people than are possessed by other local bodies, and 
thus solves to a large extent the problem of local 
self-government7" (Howard, 1902, p. 92: my italics)•
This is probably the reason for Howard's emphasis on the physical 
realisation of his objectives. Local authorities' responsibilities 
were very much less than they were to become, and their power to influence 
the organisation of communities, through provision of services, infra­
structure and housing was restricted - in other words their effective 
planning powers were nowhere near as powerful as they became between
the wars (although most of the powers did not pass under the term
"planning"at all). Howard’s task was not to convince local authorities 
that they could achieve the benefits of Garden City, but to demonstrate 
the realism of the method of development to private but public-spirited 
developers. Letchworth was the practical demonstration which Howard 
embarked upon to do this. And its growth was not so convincingly smooth
as might have been hoped. The success of the scheme of buying inaccessible
land cheaply and increasing its value by endowing it with accessibility, 
depends on raising enough capital for the initial period of development, 
when money is being spent in large, indivisible lumps, but no revenue 
is coming in. Both Letchworth and Welwyn were severely hampered by the 
inability of the conventional capital market to produce enough money to 
finance the costly initial period before "takeoff". Both depended on the 
personal influence of Howard, and the faith of his sympathetic, and 
wealthy, directors. Even so, there was a recurrent conflict between
1/
the ideal of keeping the maximum development value, and the prospect 
of easing growth by allowing commercial and industrial concerns to share,
encouraging settlement by means of sale and long leases at low early land 
values.^ The slow development of the two specimen garden cities under 
the direction of "authorised associations" was Silkinfs main reason 
(or so it was claimed) for regarding them as unsuitable agencies in 
the 1946 Act.
Even if enough finance had been available, growth might still have 
been uncertain. Movement of industry is the key, and individual firms 
have, during the last sixty years, proved irritatingly cautious in changing 
their location patterns. Howard in "Garden Cities" is not entirely ^  
consistent on this point. He recognises the benefits of Wakefield’s 
proposals for colonising by moving fully-formed socially-balanced 
communities en bloc, ensuring a large market for entrepreneurs and a good 
choice of services and employment for settlers. But he gives no indi­
cation of how the problems of initial growth, which must be unbalanced, 
arising from individual decisions, were to be solved. Presumably he 
believed that the long-term advantages of the garden city economy would 
triumph: short term disadvantages would not prevail. There is a suggestion 
that Letchworth was deliberately chosen as a difficult location, to 
demonstrate the strength of the Garden City idea in even adverse conditions.
By 1938, Barlow could observe:
"Their (Letchworth and Welwyn) appeal was largely to those 
in sympathy with the ideas of the founders: this somewhat 
limited appeal, at any rate in the early days, may account 
for the comparatively slow growth of these two communities"
(Barlow, 1940, para 272).
Certainly "those in sympathy" included a rich array of eccentrics and
cranks, but whether this was lunacy or a renaissance of personality
depended on one’s notion of human advancement. Much more regimented
1• Osborn and Whittich , pp. 46-48.
development of new towns after 1946 meant that the Government and its 
resources were devoted to the successful development. But would this 
mean conscription of those not "in sympathy", Conservatives asked in the 
debate in 1946?
The self-sufficiency of the garden city was affected also in 
administrative theory between 1902 and 1946. Before the advent of formal 
planning powers, house provision constituted the vital change in circum­
stances. In 1902, provision of housing for rent was not a conventional 
responsibility of any public authority. Local authorities did not 
provide rented houses, and neither did Howard regard it a point of his 
municipality's task to do so. Both the incidental discussion of housing, 
and the means of provision contemplated are in sharp contrast to the 
prime importance of house provision by post-1946 Development Corporations.
"There is another large field for pro-municipal activity, 
in the work of building houses for the people. The 
municipality would be attempting too much if it essayed 
this task, at least at the outset. To do so would be 
perhaps to depart too far from the path which experience 
has justified ... The municipality has however done much 
to make the building of bright and beautiful homes for 
the people possible. It has effectually provided 
against overcrowding ... it offers sites of ample size 
at an average rate of £6 per annum for ground rent and 
rates." (Howard, 1902, p. 106)
Taking advantage of these favourable conditions posed no problems, 
because many agencies would be willing to assist "workmen secure of good 
wages" to own their homes - building societies, trade unions, co-operative 
societies, friendly societies and so on. This was not the case in 
Letchworth and Welwyn, and increasingly after 1919 provision of new homes 
for working people became less a mtter of operation of the free market, 
more within the discretion of local authorities. The simplicity, even 
in theory, with which new town policies could be put into effect 
independently of the attitudes of local authorities was gone. The 
garden city solution would be adopted only if local authorities
exerted their incluence as housing authorities in that direction.
Howard realised in 1902 that these circumstances were not favourable: 
a multiplicity of urban and rural authorities even well-disposed to each 
other will find an integrated solution difficult to attain. In practice, 
the degree of subtle analysis of planning principles in housing location, 
and the willingness of local authorities to co-operate in achieving a 
coherent solution in the wider public interest is very unsatisfactory, 
and continues to be. This regrettably provides Peter Hall with his main 
theme in his recent analysis of the achievement of British statutory 
planning (Hall, 1973)* Local authority boundaries are tightly drawn 
around urban areas. Counties are unwilling to have "urban problems" 
foisted on them: encroachment of public housing, industry and commerce 
is disliked. Conversely urban areas are unwilling to lose population 
and rateable value.
"The planning powers created in 1947 could only be 
wielded fairly by some agency big enough to encompass 
and weigh up both urban and rural interests: either 
a central national authority, or a local government 
unit based on the notion of town and country. But 
in some of the most problematic areas we seem little 
further in achieving a structure of “this kind than we 
were in 1947." (Hall, 1973, p.415)
At least in 1947 there was a statutory provision for the ultimate 
supremacy of the wider "public interest": each local planning authority's 
proposals were scrutinised to ensure that this was considered, and sub­
sequent decisions could be challenged. There was no such limitation on 
local authorities' laissez faire planning decisions between the wars.
The problem for followers of Howard after 1918 was how to ensure that 
with their new powers to help, or hinder new town planning, authorities 
did the former.
Many of Howard's supporters were in fact only admirers of the
principles of Letchworth and Welwyn - indeed it is a sad paradox that 
it was the work of Parker and Unwin which was, with government encourage­
ment, used up and down the country as the physical semblance of "Garden 
City", perhaps stifling true understanding of the planning principles 
which lay behind the pleasing design. These interpreters failed Howard 
in their limited understanding of his vision, which was nothing less than 
a transformation of the spatial organisation of activity, so as to maxi­
mise "quality of environment" and "accessibility to opportunities".
The characteristics of town and country were (as outlined in the famous 
magnets diagram) opposite, but equally unacceptable combinations of these 
two attributes. The achievement of the "town-country" combination of 
the best of both worlds now required the collaboration of town and country 
local authorities, particularly in the use of their house-provision 
powers•
Howard also developed the national implications of his model.
"... the idea of a well-planned town such as I have 
described will not have prepared the reader for the 
later development which must inevitably follow - 
the planning and building of town clusters - each 
town in the cluster being of a different design from 
the others, and yet the whole forming -part of one 
large and well thought out ulan."(Howard 1902,p.139)
"... if the movement is to be carried on in anything 
like a scientific fashion, stretches of land far 
larger than that occupied by our first experiment 
must be obtained." (p.139)
Purdom (1963) picks up the implications of this:
"... he thought that parliamentary powers would be 
necessary for the larger project (the system of 
social cities)• He was thus in principle a 
regional-nlanning -pioneer." (p.5)
The organisation of a national system of garden cities was a task 
beyond the proper competence of autonomous public-spirited private
development agencies, yet Howard neglects to consider how regional- 
metropolitan planning of this kind will be achieved - why? This is 
perhaps a great deal to ask of one popular text, but the outcome does 
concern Howard. His neglect of details of regional and national 
administration is due to his supreme confidence that the case for garden 
cities is so overwhelming that administrative arrangements could be left 
to follow in the wake of such an irresistible system of planning:
" (are) crowded, ill-ventilated, unplanned, unwieldy, 
unhealthy cities - ulcers on the very face of our 
beautiful island - to stand as barriers to the 
introduction of towns in which modern scientific 
methods and the aims of social reformers may have the 
fullest scope in which to express themselves? No, it 
cannot be, at least not for long." (Howard, 1902, p. 145)
"The reader is therefore earnestly asked not to take 
it for granted that the large cities in which he may 
perhaps take pardonable pride are ... any more 
permanent than the stage-coach system which was the 
subject of so much admiration just at the very moment 
when it was about to be supplanted by the railways." (p.146)
With this conviction, Howard satisfied himself with the suggestion 
that the oberburdened "Imperial Parliament" would devalue considerable 
powers on the local authorities, who would be eager and willing to devise 
and build social cities.
"Vested interests" are dismissed in very unspecific terms. Garden 
Cities will triumph because:
1. Vested interests, in land and property, will be divided. Some will 
resist garden cities, some will apply their expertise and property 
to their development.
2. "Men of goodwill" will inevitably support garden cities.
3. Influential groups will accept garden cities rather than face 
socialism.
4. The popular demands of "those who work for their living" (shades of 
Chamberlaini) will prove irresistible.
5. The development of garden cities is a noble aim which will call
forth the energies of a dangerously divided nation. (Howard 19G2» p.147)
Perhaps we speak with the unfair advantage of hindsight, but 
Howard appears rather unworldly in his estimate of the readiness with 
which existing settlements would give up population, rateable value, 
and the prospects of civic growth. He spares no civic feelings in his 
dismissal of prospects for improvement in existing settlements.
"The simple issue to be faced, and faced resolutely is: 
can better results be obtained by starting on a bold 
plan on comparatively virgin soil than by attempting 
to adapt our old cities to our newer and higher needs?
Thus fairly faced, the question can only be answered 
in one way: and when that simple fact is well grasped, 
the social revolution will speedily commence."
(Howard, 1902, p. 146)
This seems rather harsh when compared with his earlier remarks, 
that town clusters might take a great variety of physical shapes, as long 
as the essential garden city attributes of quality of environment and 
accessibility to opportunities were preserved for working people: so 
why could existing towns and cities not plan themselves along these 
lines? Two reasons suggest themselves: first, this method would not 
allow purchase of land entirely free of development value - Howard had 
no expectation that nationalisation of development value might be con­
templated, or that a similar end result might be achieved by government 
subsidy of house provision around existing towns. Second - probably less 
justified - Howard was too influenced by the London situation - a fault 
which many of his successors continued - notably Barlow. The result 
was that other local authorities did not regard his conclusions as 
applicable to them (indeed, London local authorities have consistently 
been better disposed to new town and expanded town planning than any 
others)•
Awareness of political realism is thus the light in which to view 
the Pabian response to "Tomorrow - a Peaceful Path to Real Reform"
project they might have been expected to welcome):
"His plans would have been in time if they had been 
submitted to the Romans when they conquered Britain. 
They set about laying-out cities, and our forefathers 
have dwelt in them to this day. Now Mr. Howard 
proposes to pull them all down^ and substitute garden 
cities.
We have got to make the best of our existing cities, 
and proposals for building new ones are as useful 
as would be arrangements for protection against 
visits from Mr. Wells* Martians."
(Fabian News, December 1898)
A significant misunderstanding.
WHO SHALL BUILD THE NEW TOWNS: THE PATH FOLLOWED UP
Although the post-war climate was favourable to planning in the 
sense of greater supervision of the conditions in which people lived, the 
task of securing a "garden city" solution was by no means easy. There 
is never any problem in recruiting public support for good housing, but 
good planning is a much more nebulous (and more controversial) quantity. 
No houses had been built during the war, maintenance had been neglected, 
and the public imagination was fixed with the vision of new houses, not 
"social cities" or "town clusters". Lloyd George’s "Land fit for heroes" 
quickly became "Homes for Heroes". The Tudor-Walters Report had con­
centrated attention on housing quality.
Altogether, official and public opinion was running strongly in 
the direction of "environmental quality". "Access to opportunities" 
seems almost entirely neglected: it is more difficult to understand, 
more difficult to demand, and more difficult to provide.
When Howard wrote it.was possible for the balance to be struck 
within "municipalities" whose landlord powers made almost free to operate 
with little local authority control. By 1918 it was apparent that the 
influence of central and local government could only increase. This then 
was the challenge for followers of Howard's ideas - to ensure that the 
inevitable development beyond their control was informed by garden city 
principles. The dangers were illustrated by Britain's first, albeit 
ineffective essay in planning legislation, the Planning Act of 1909:
"What irony that the first step in England towards town- 
planning was directly away from the principles of the 
garden city, from which planning was said to have gained 
its impulseI For the fact remains that the 1909 Act 
was concerned only with furthering the suburban planning 
of towns and cities, the very thing which the garden 
city was designed in principle to stop." (Purdom, 1963, P«18)
Howard's early plan for winning support was two-fold, to 
demonstrate the garden city in operation and to influence informed 
public opinion "by a little skill in the grouping of forces and the 
manipulation of ideas". In 1918 the scope for improvement through 
personal intervention was very limited. Letchworth had proved itself, 
and what was required was a great feat of proselytization. But at 
this point Howard succumbed to the temptation of another personal 
achievement - the building of Welwyn. Mumford (1945) emphasises the 
significance of this:
"At the end of the last war, his younger lieutenant,
Mr. F. J. Osborn, proposed to build "New Towns after 
the War", on a scale commensurate with the current 
needs for housing and rehousing: a proposal which 
required complete legislative backing. Howard's 
absorption in the launching of the second garden 
city diverted energy from the more important work 
that Mr. Osborn had outlined; and the broad political 
need to unite housing and industrial rehabilitation 
with urban improvement was subordinated to a muddled 
and wasteful effort at town expansion and estate t-
building within the existing urban areas." (p.37)
Letchworth and Welwyn may not even have been useful as examples 
of garden city principles. To those who had not read Howard (and to 
many who had!) they were excellent examples of garden cottage settle­
ments: the superb design work of Parker and Unwin was undoubtedly the 
most influential aspect of the towns. And ironically their economic 
success depended on accessibility to the metropolis: in no sense did they 
influence the surrounding economy in the way that Howard had intended. 
Incidentally, the towns gained a popular reputation as something of an 
eccentrics' colony (see John Betjeman's "Group Life: Letchworth").
The phrase "garden city" proved enormously popular, and supporters 
of the pure Howard vision fought hard to distinguish their garden 
cities from thousands of what they regarded as mis-named travesties.
In fact the superiority of Letchworth and Welwyn was not readily apparent 
to people with no personal commitment to Howard's experiments. The
The huge council estates were clearly worse in accessibility of 
residents to employment, but the vast majority of smaller "garden suburbs" 
were no worse in their effective "accessibility to services", even if 
these were not part of the same development.
Garden suburbs were however the outcome of the existing political 
and administrative organisation of the country, whereas a system 1/  
of town clusters planned "in a scientific fashion" would have required 
a very different structure of administration. The distinction is 
reflected in the aspects of new town development which early legislation 
covered. Section 10 of the Housing (Additional Powers) Act 1919 empowered 
the Minister of Health compulsorily to purchase land for garden city 
development "if necessary or expedient so to do for the purpose of 
securing the development of the land as aforesaid." This he could do on 
behalf of any local authority (including a county council), or two or 
more authorities, or an authorised association, whom he was satisfied 
were able and willing to develop the land as "a garden city (or garden 
suburb or garden village)". An "authorised association" was
"any society, company or body of persons approved by the 
Minister whose objects include the promotion, formation 
or management of garden cities (including garden suburbs 
and garden villages) or the erection, improvement or 
management of buildings for the working classes and others, 
which does not trade for profit, or whose constitution 
forbids payment of any interest or dividend at a rate 
higher than six per centum per annum."
(Housing Act 1919, Section 10, para 4)
Section 16 of the Town Planning Act 1925 gave the Minister the 
additional right to authorise the Public Works Loans Commissioners to 
lend money to approved garden city developers, subject to conditions 
and limits fixed by the Treasury (local authorities had been empowered 
to borrow for garden dties as for any housing development by the 1919 Act). 
The other provisions were repeated almost word for word and the whole 
was repeated in the Town Planning Act, 1932. Identical legislation
covered Scotland.
Several interesting points arise. The legislation tackled the two 
major problems which garden city development by private bodies had thrown 
up, namely acquisition of large sites, and finance of the early stages 
of development. It did not tackle the problems of grafting new town 
development by public bodies into the framework of the (growing) powers, 
responsibilities and attitudes of existing local government agencies ^ 
(which is what the1946 Act did do). There seems to have been no serious 
thought about why local authorities would contemplate garden city develop­
ment. On the other hand this could hardly have mattered when what 
constituted garden city development was so vague. Garden "city” "suburb" 
and "village" appear almost interchangeable, and one suspects that variety 
of nomenclature covered the lowest common denominator - garden suburbs.
This impression is incidentally confirmed by a reservation attached to 
the Departmental Committee of the Ministry of Health set up in 1920 
under Neville Chamberlain to establish "The Principles to be Followed 
in Dealing with the Unhealthy Areas". This report is often cited as the 
first official advocacy of the garden city principle, and certainly without 
a paragraph’s reasoning, the report stated that "horizontal" building 
(i.e. as against multi-storey building)
"can best take place in garden cities of about 50,000, 
outside London^, each surrounded by a green belt (sic)"
However, the reservation, by Mr. E. J. Brown, expressed the view that it 
would be unwise to prescribe garden cities until the transport problems 
caused by the existing estates round London had been examined. What 
sort of "garden city" had the committee in mind, which would cause traffic 
problems in the municipality which built it? Certainly not any which
1 • As with Howard, attention is again virtually confined to the 
metropolitan experience.
Howard had advocated.
Unfortunately, there is no way of knowing precisely what constituted 
a garden city (suburb, village) for the Ministry of Health, since no 
projects were carried out under the legislation. Instead, almost four 
million houses were built between the wars in ways which intelligent 
observers abominated:
"New houses spread along the main roads in the ribbon 
building characteristic of the period, with little 
stubs a hundred yards or so down the side roads.
These new settlements had no centres, no sense, no
communal spirit. They were composed of little more
than individual cars come to rest." A.J.P. Taylor (1965, p.26)
One consequence of disquiet about the new tendencies was the 
Control on Ribbon Development Act, another an inquiry into "Garden Cities 
and Satellite Towns" under Lord Marley in 1934* This study appears to 
have suffered undeserved critical neglect, normally being mentioned briefly 
as an equally ineffectual companion to the Chamberlain Committee Report.
It is in fact a planning document of notable vigour and breadth of 
vision. Even in terms of reference illustrate the realism, notably 
absent from earlier discussion of the encouragement of garden city 
development:
"To examine the experience already gained in regard to the 
establishment of garden cities and villages and satellite 
towns and to make recommendations as to:
a) the steps, if any, which should be taken by the 
government or local authorities to extend the 
provision of such garden cities, villages and 
satellite towns;
b) in particular, how the location of industry in 
them can be stimulated;
c) the questions of finance and local government 
connected with their establishment; and
d) what further measures, if any, can and should 
be taken for securing that in the extension of 
existing towns, industrial, residential and other 
developments are properly correlated."
(Marley Report 1935, para l)
"Proper correlation of developments" is ihe key to the combination 
of environmental quality and access to opportunities which Howard was 
basically concerned with, and these terms of reference are less pre­
judiced in favour of a particular physical form of combination (i.e. 
the closely-bounded new development), than the Reith Committee were 
given.^ The committee responded with a wholehearted commitment to 
achieving the substance of the garden city model, and not isolated 
examples of ideal settlements, however appealing or fulfilling these 
might appear:
"The first three sections of our terms of reference lay 
particular stress on "garden Cities", "Garden Villages" 
and "Satellite Towns" and would appear to invite 
consideration of them as a detached and isolated problem.
We deem it essential at the outset of our report to state 
that our investigations have led us to view "Garden 
cities" and other developments of a similar kind rather 
as elements in the wider sphere of regional and national 
planning than as constituting a problem apart ... ✓
If we view in correct perspective the ordered planning 
of the whole country, which may be taken to be the 
fundamental purpose of town and regional planning, 
then the garden city, the satellite town and the 
garden village fall into place as incidental items in 
the general plan. It is therefore mainly in relation 
to the proper and orderly correlation of industrial 
residential and other developments specifically referred 
to in connection with expansion of towns in the fourth 
section of our terms of reference that we propose to 
consider the problems involved in our terms of reference 
taken as a whole." (Marley Report 1935> para 4)
This crispness of thought is characteristic of the report: it is, 
for example, one of the few documents to say exactly why ribbon develop­
ment and "sprawl" are undesirable, viz.:
1. "To consider the general questions of the establishment, development, 
organisation and administration that will arise in the promotion 
of New Towns in furtherance of a policy of planned decentralisation 
from congested urban areas; and in accordance therewith to suggest 
guiding principles on which such Towns should be established and 
developed as self-contained and balanced communities for work 
and living."
(New Towns Committee, Interim Report, p.2)
1• The resultant agglomerations are unco-ordinated. Dormitory areas 
without employment, industrial areas with no labour force, are created 
without thought as to consequences.
2. Suburban developments usually lack open space.
3. Costs are imposed on local authorities when development is taken 
beyond the capacity of the road system.
4. Arterial roads designed to relieve congestion are exploited by 
developers, and oongestion becomes as bad as ever.
5. Amenities and values in existing settlements are uncontrollably 
prejudiced by new development.
6. Servicing of unplanned development is costly.
7. More land is despoiled than necessary: ribbon development wastes 
more land than it uses.
8. Those in central areas must spend much time and money to reach 
the countryside.
9. Central congestion is actually worsened. (Marley Report 1935* Para 6)
In short, the case against dormitory housing estates is put ia 
terms of "quality of environment" and "accessibility to opportunities."
"(dormitory housing estates) provide better living conditions 
for the families who occupy them: but they again produce 
serious economic and sociological problems. Waste of time 
and energy, together with heavy outlay, are involved in 
taking large numbers of workers to and from their work 
in the city; and the fares necessarily form a drain on 
the family incomes." (Marley Report, 1935* para 6)
For these reasons, the Committee felt justified in advocating 
satellite towns:
"Broadly speaking, we are of the opinion that when a town 
reaches a certain size (which must vary within wide limits) 
contiguous growth round the fringe tends to create evils 
I that outweight any disadvantages; and we therefore 
t advocate a definite policy of outward development taking 
the form of complete planned units with due provision
for industry, residence, social services and recreation, 
at some distance from the original nucleus - a type of 
development for which the term "Satellite Town" is not 
inappropriate.” (ibid., para 8)
Since the problem was seen as one of integrated planning throughout 
the country, local authorities were regarded as responsible:
"Having regard to the fact that we view the problem mainly 
in its relationship to existing centres of population 
where congestion already exists and where by slum 
clearance and replanning an opportunity may be afforded 
for decentralisation and outward development, we have 
come to the conclusion that it is the function of the 
Local Authorities of the greater towns and cities to 
undertake such development. We see no serious diffi- 
culty in the setting up of an adequate and efficient 
development organisation under the aegis^ of the councils 
of our great towns including London.
... provisions have been on the statute book for more 
than a decade •••
What we propose is to instil life into these provisions 
in order that they may be used." (ibid. para 12)
The means of doing this was to be a national planning agency.
Howard had anticipated the need to ensure that each city and town cluster
formed "part of one large and well-thought-out plan" but had not discussed
the administrative machinery necessary to achieve this. The "Planning 
Board" represents an attempt to redress the neglect:
"... we are of the opinion that it is an essential that
the problem should be dealt with as a national problem 
affecting the country as a whole. We are of the opinion 
that the first essential step is that the Government 
should establish at the earliest date possible a Planning 
Board appointed by the Minister of Health ... under whose 
aegis should be brought the question of land development 
throughout the country. By this means alone do we see 
any possibility of an effective handling of the general 
situation on broad lines." (ibid. para 9)
The central position of the Planning Board in the Committee^ 
proposals probably explains the apparent neglect of its other terms
1. This presumably implies a local authority sponsored agency, with 
a degree of protection from day-to-day influence, such as accepted 
by the Reith Report.
of reference - for example location of industry and finance and local 
government problems* Once set up, the Planning Board would have the 
responsibility and expertise to consider all these matters. The Committee 
started with the most comprehensive planning view of the problem it 
faced, and its recommendations were equally comprehensive. The Govern­
ment, through the Planning Board was to:
- determine the ideal regional distribution of population and industry,
- encourage local authorities to produce planning schemes,
- carry out planning functions (including garden city development) in 
default of tardy local autoorities,
- modify planning schemes to conform to the desired national and 
regional patterns,
- foster co-operation amongst local authorities and between local 
authorities and private developers,
- advise on legislation,
- settle the problems of compensation and betterment.
The Board was, incidentally, to comprise five members - though admittedly 
"of the highest calibre"! In presenting these ambitious proposals, the 
Committee felt that:
"... the time is ripe for serious consideration of the new 
methods which should be adopted in regard to the planning 
of new areas and the replanning of the present built-up 
areas throughout the country. We consider that the 
present time offers a favourable opportunity for the 
introduction of carefully thought out plans of development 
and reconstruction." (Marley Report 1935, para 7)
Unfortunately, they were wrong, and it is difficult to know whether 
to regret that an opportunity for more limited new town development 
was missed through over-ambition, or to suggest that new town 
development not co-ordinated with other planning as the Report demanded, 
may do more harm than good. In any case, the degree of intervention
suggested was not acceptable - even to some dissenting Committee members, 
who felt that existing agencies were quite adequate: they should simply 
have been asked to co-operate more effectively. For those in local 
administration the Five Wise Men of the Planning Board had unfortunate 
antecedents - the Central Commissioners of the Poor Law, the "Three 
Bashaws of Somerset House" for example; and Edwin Chadwick's somewhat 
comparable Public Health Board had in 1853 foundered in a sea of local 
government hostility after only five very tempestuous years (cholera, 
not overcrowding, had been its remit). In many ways the famous Victorian 
hostility to government intervention was not adherence to the classic 
doctrineB of laissez faire at all, but intense hostility towards 
centralised intervention. Local authorities did not like to see 
themselves as agents of centrally-approved planning, and it is difficult 
to see that a Board with powers verging on direction of population and 
industry* would have been acceptable, even in the depths of Depression - 
perhaps particularly then: un-depressed areas would hardly have welcomed 
redistribution, and one dissident Committee member puts the view that 
business was so bad that further controls on industrial activity were 
quite unwise.
While the Committee generally feels content to leave details of 
administration to the Planning Board, it does make some specific comments 
which are not always convincing. In dealing with the serious problem 
of local authorities' unwillingness to provide and pay for services 
for overspill people from another area, the Committee rejects the
1. "These (industries) would be directed to satellites in common 
with other new development as part of the general plan for 
securing sound and orderly location."
(Marley Report 1935 para 13)
view that the developing authority should also take over administrative 
responsibility^confident that:
"... there will be found to be no insuperable difficulties 
in administration or in contacts with other Local Authorities 
responsible for local government administration in the case 
where the land is outside the boundaries of the promoting 
Authority." (Marley Report, 1935 para 12)
Yet the experience of Wythenshawe, a case regarded as relevant, 
was quite the opposite, as is clear from the Appendix describing its 
progress:
"The development of the estate was hindered at the outset by . *7
difficulties in connection with the provision of the necessary, 
in view of the fact that the land concerned was not within a _ 
the city ... When the estate was added to the City, the 
Corporation at once proceeded with the provision of main 
drainage facilities ..." (ibid. Appendix II)
Developments distant enough to be satellites and not suburbs could 
not be annexed: what was the solution to be?
Wythenshawe and Speke ought also to have raised the problems of 
administration in pursuit of social balance, yet the Committee failed 
to face this in a realistic way. The report makes the conventional case 
for social balance:
"Segregation of one class in a district .•• must tend 
in the nature of things to lead to undesirable social 
reactions.” (ibid. Para 7)
Yet if local authorities undertake garden city development it will 
be directed at helping those in need: this does not result in a 
"balanced community", a problem of resource allocation and priorities 
which has bedevilled new town development continuously.
Why should it be, in any case, that a Report which started with the 
conviction that the problem was each of co-ordination of development in 
existing settlements in the end committed itself to satellite towns 
at some distance from the original city protected by a green belt?
The Committee agreed that the "ideal" size of city "must vary within wide 
limits", so in what way was satellite development superior to well- 
planned town expansion in normal circumstances (London clearly being an 
exception)? Indeed the Committee do go some way in this direction:
"The remedy may well be found in organising growth beyond 
such limits by means of satellite units having some independent 
local life but depending on the parent town for those 
conveniences and amenties which only a large population can 
support.
We do not suggest that there are no circumstances in which 
it might be desirable to build relatively isolated and 
detached new towns of the Garden City type. There may 
be economic justification for such new towns in connection 
with the development of mineral deposits ... and in 
certain other cases, but we think that normally it is 
in the direction of Satellite Towns having an economic 
bond with existing centres of population that it will 
be found most desirable to proceed." (ibid. Para 8)
The justification for some degree of insulation was social:
"A town may become overgrown as a single unit, just as may 
happen to any other organism. The community lines in such 
cases become weakened or lost." (ibid. Para 8).
This is for the Report an unusual uncritical acceptance of received 
sentiment. Self-sufficiency depends on the range of human needs that 
can be met within a settlement unit. If this range is large (as the 
Committee clearly desired for all areas of each town) then there is no 
need to enforce containment by green belt insulation. If the range is 
deficient, then insulation can only impose costs and frustration on 
residents, and the (fully accepted) access to higher-level choice and 
services is made unnecessarily more costly and troublesome. If the 
elements of self-sufficiency are present, then it should make no 
difference to "community links" whether the town centre and its 
satellites are spread over one mile or ten. The Committee constructed 
a model of hierarchical settlements and accessibility, then gave the 
model a misleading and unnecessary spatial dimension. They confused 
a single geographical unit with a single functional unit, when evidence
was becoming available that what appeared to be an inconveniently large 
agglomeration could have all the desirable functional characteristics 
of the formal town cluster - and could certainly be given them by exactly 
the kind of integrated planning which the Committee demanded. Hall (1973) 
regarded this tendency as characteristic of the physical bias in British 
planning thought:
"Preference for a certain quality of urban life are also 
clearly seen in the formulation and operation of the 
British planning system. The values of smallness, 
compactness, neatness and tidiness in settlement design, 
reflect these values in British life generally ... The 
small, comprehensively-planned community is a neat and tidy 
unit of urban life when compared with the great sprawling, 
dirty, congested city ... Small, clearly-bounded towns 
are preferred to large cities whose suburbs straggle 
out across the countryside."
(Hall 1973t PP 370-71, myitalics)
In the context of the Marley Report, this pre-disposition perhaps 
explains the belief that only if self-containment and independence 
(desirable in terms of ease of access to opportunities) could be 
seen on a map would these attributes be attained. Green belts, which 
functionally might appear to be either troublesome or unnecessary, in 
this physical model are essential as cordons sanitaire, keeping each 
town free of the contaminating influence of its neighbours. (The 
Report recommends them on the grounds that they provide open space for 
recreation use: why this space cannot equally well be dispersed throughout 
larger towns is not explained.)
Another aspect of the "new or expanded" choice mentioned in the 
report, then neglected is that of resource cost, or more accurately the 
savings from full exploitation of underused infrastructure. This practical 
matter, quite overlooked in the elevated debates are "essays on civilisation 
in 1946*,* proved of crucial importance in the succeeding years, and was 
a major influence in the change of official policy towards expanded towns
after 1950. Mention of it is rare in discussion, and it is unfortunate 
that it was not more fully pursued in the 1930s for it is a significant 
factor in the "jobs to workers, workers to jobs" debate:
"A close enquiry should be made to ascertain how far it 
may be possible to attract new industry to the areas where 
unemployment is rife ••• having regard to the fact that 
such areas have already been provided with adequate services 
such as water, gas and electrical power, and have in existence 
schools, institutions, churches and all the accessories of 
modern life."
(Marley Report 1935* para 9)*
The Dissenting Note of one R. Bell highlights the failure of the 
Report's analytical rigour on the point of green-field or reorganised 
towns^: not everyone was diverted by the tidy Utopianism of the 
entirely new town:
"The nation that future growth should take the form of 
independent satellite towns is not based on convincing 
evidence, and the actual trend of events contradicts 
any theoretical argument^ in favour of the idea. Towns 
extend their limits gradually as a rule and "ribbon 
development" plays a great part in their expansion 
certainly "ribbon development" should be controlled but 
that is an easy matter in comparison with the substitution 
of a system of founding satellite towns for the natural 
tendency of places to expand at various points round their 
original boundaries2. In reality the formation of each 
"satellite" would raise a new set of problems in regard 
to public services and transport facilities."
(ibid. Dissenting Note i)
Despite its limitations, the Marley Report represents a prescient 
and concise argument for comprehensive national and local planning.
Its particular views sometimes appear naive, but it makes a sound, and 
above all, explicit case for planning, and is basically correct in the
1. It should be remembered that if as assumed, the problems of 
compensation and betterment were solved, there would be no 
greater economy in building on green-field sites.
2. Mr Bell over-estimates the opposition case: no theoretical 
arguments are marshalled.
direction it feels further research should be taken. Its demand that
garden city planning must be seen "as elements in the wider sphere of 
regional and national planning (rather) than as constituting a problem 
apart" was notably realistic, as editorials in the journal of the Town 
and Country Planning Association admit:
"I am afraid that the Garden City movement has itself been partly 
responsible for the neglect of the periphery of London. We 
have perhaps stressed too much the full-blooded conception 
of the detached, isolated Garden City and we have not urged 
sufficiently the need for control of suburban development 
along Garden City lines."
(Town and Country Planning, June 1936)
"For better or worse, however, the major job of the forseeable 
future will be to improve existing cities and hence to deal 
with existing social, economic and political facts."
(ibid. September 1936)
The Barlow Commission Report was a more influential document than 
the Marley Report, but its contribution to the function of garden cities 
and their administration is incidental and slight. "Garden cities" 
were viewed alongside "Trading Estates" as a useful means of decentralisation 
and dispersal, the value of which was inferred from the Report as a 
whole. Their value was defined in terms of "environmental quality" 
at work and in the home, and the model constructed is comparable to that 
of the Marley Report - satellites offering high environmental quality 
plus "industrial and other occupational opportunites, preferably with 
reasonable diversification"; these with links to larger centres, although 
only, it appears, for access to "medical, educational and recreational 
facilities". It was not envisaged that wider employment opportunities 
would be a significant attraction, only "good plays and films" (do no 
new town residents ever harken after bad plays or films?)
Barlow however added a realistic new element: the Commissioners 
accepted that creation of entirely new cities could only be on a limited 
scale. Satellites might equally well be developed through "extensions
on properly planned lines of existing small towns and villages" (para 290)•
Why not properly-planned extensions of large cities? Here again 
there is evidence of how the seductive idea of small clearly-bounded 
towns could prevail over contrary evidence. Frank Pick (Hall, 1973» 
p. 48 , 378-81) that it was not the case that work journeys must increase 
with city size, if employment decentralised alongside population, as was 
happening in an unplanned way in London. Here in 1921, 93$ of all public 
tranport journeys were under four miles: in 1937> 96$. During the 1930s, 
half work journeys were between suburbs, not radial journeys to the 
centre. Although London had the physical apperance of a single economic 
unit too large for movement to be convenient, in fact it functioned 
much as a town cluster, with suburbs as satellite towns and the inner 
core as the central city.
Significantly, Pich still approved of a halt to further growth, 
for social and aesthetic reasons: he fearedthat a "confluent pox" 
would engulf the home counties. The Barlow Committee may also have 
had "strategical" considerations in mind when they accepted the general 
s entiment•
As to who should be responsible for garden city construction, 
both the majority and minority reports favour local authorities: they 
can service speedy development, and guarantee a flow of migrants to 
match capacity, and ones who are likely to carry out development will 
have enough resources to carry the town through the early unprofitable 
phase. For these practical rather than ideological reasons, private 
enterprise development is not encouraged.
Where Marley had appeared to neglect the experience of Wythenshawe, 
Barlow heeded the evidence of Manchester and Liverpool Corporations 
on Wythenshawe and Speke, and accepted that for trouble-free development, 
land should lie inside the promoter's administrative boundary (para 282).
Yet the Report also insisted that the garden cities should be "placed 
well outside the existing town ••• protected by a belt of open country 
so as to avoid eventual coalescence with the existing town." (para 284)*
This combination would seem to have led to important changes in 
local authority boundaries - either extensions of cities taking in at 
least the area of green belt between city and satellite, or detached 
areas of city administration in surrounding counties. It is difficult 
to believe that would normally have proved a simple or fruitful means t/ 
of garden city development.
The Commissioners may have intended the resolution to be worked 
out by central agency recommended to ensure that garden city develop­
ment is neither haphazard nor inefficient:
"Finally, if the risk of wasteful competition is to be 
avoided, it seems necessary in the interests of the 
community as a whole, that some supervision should be 
exercised by the government over the location and growth 
of garden cities and satellite towns ..." (ibid, para 285)
Majority and minority reports differed on the form which the 
supervision should have taken. The majority felt that it should be 
part of the duties of the 'National Industrial Board.* The minority 
(which included Patrick Abercrombie) saw it as part of a wider planning 
function, and called for a body somewhat comparable to Harley's Planning 
Board, but given greater political weight by being an independent 
government ministry, rather than appointed agents of the Ministry 
of Health. In particular, this Ministry:
".. should have power to promote, assist or encourage the 
building of satellite towns ... by local authorities or 
other bodies; and to make grants and raise loans for the 
purpose of acquiring land and building-development values."
(ibid. page 223)
The latter was the outcome of the war-time commitment to post­
war planning, and for this reason some have seen Barlow's advocacy
of new town development as a significant step towards its achievement. 
In fact, the Commission's treatment of new towns as such is incidental 
and superficial: it makes no contribution towards resolving, or even 
identifying the problems which had to be tackled before new towns as 
we now know them became a reality. Barlow is not a major advance in 
this respect. What it did do however, was give enormous weight to 
the case for national and local planning, and rightly or wrongly, new 
town development was in most people's eyes part of the bag and baggage 
of the planner. New town development was in this way helped into the 
field of planning matters which the wartime government were committed 
to examining and developing.
THE REITH REPORTS AND THE NEW TOWNS ACT
At first sight, the prospects for a formal commitment to new 
towns after 1945» would seem slight. There was a high degree of 
public determination that Britain after the war should be a better 
place than the 'land fit for heroes' which had turned so sour after 
1920, but this was expressed in terms of the tangible aspects of 
social welfare; ffcll employment, social security, a free health service 
and (again) good housing. "Good planning", according to Lord Reith, 
inspired "massive indifference", and even when planning matters were 
discussed - the Uckwatt Report, and the 1944 ^own and Country Planning 
Bill for example - it was rare to find garden cities raised save by 
the enthusiastic members of the Town and Country Planning Association 
(formerly the Garden Cities Association) in andcut of Parliament.
"In those daysihe idea of new towns was far from 
popular. The big local authorities disliked the 
thought of new rateable value going outside their 
areas; the small rural authorities held out no 
welcome to London's overcrowded millions. The 
urban electorate and the men and women returning 
from the forces wanted houses and jobs, a reshaping 
of the economy and a new prosperity, but how, when 
and where was not in issue ... New towns were merely 
one of many question marks, and there was no noticeable 
enthusiasm for them in Parliament or among the general 
public." (Schaffer 1970, p. 12)
The emergence of the new town legislation out of this uncertainty 
and apathy is due largely to the evangelical commitment of two men - 
Lewis Silkin and Lord Reith. Silkin was appointed Minister of Town 
and Country Planning by Attlee in 1945» and in that busy administration 
was given a high degree of personal discretion. He was deeply 
dedicated to the new town as a means of post-war reconstruction, 
and called in Reith not to examine the scope for new towns in this work, 
but;
"To consider the general questions of the establishment, 
development, organisation aid administration that will 
arise in the promotion of New Towns in furtherance 
of a policy of planned decentralisation from congested 
urban areas; and in accordance therewith to suggest 
guiding principles on which such Towns should be 
established and developed as self-contained and 
balanced communities for work and living."
(Reith, Interim Report, page 2)
Schaffer (1970) who was at this point an official in the Ministry 
suggests that a great deal of the groundwork had already been done 
under W. S. Morrison and Lewis Silkin, and that Reith was partly 
engaged on public relations work, presenting arguments in which appeared 
to be an impartial manner, and giving independent authority to the 
machinery being developed.
The most important administrative issue to be discussed was 
the agency to build the new towns, and the Committee recognised new 
towns were not likely to be developed under existing local authority 
arrangements. Barlow had left unresolved the question of how an 
urban local authority could administer a block of land at some distance. 
Reith quickly established that boundary extensions taking in intervening 
land "beyond question would be strongly opposed by country and district 
authorities". On the other hand;
"The representatives of some large cities were in general 
indisposed to consider functioning as land-owners and 
developers in other authority's area ... They made it 
dear that they were anxious to retain their populations, 
rehoused if necessary, within their existing or extended 
boundaries•"
(Reith, Interim Report, page 7)
Despite this, and the fact that for importing areas, new towns 
meant heavy initial expenses not met by rateable value increases, 
for the apparent benefit of "outsiders", Reith was anxious to allow 
for local-authority-sponsored development, and suggested that local-
authority sponsored public corporations should be used to achieve this.
It is undoubtedly true that for single-minded development, an agency 
with one clearly-defined task, reasonably free from day-to-day political 
interference is a more efficient machine than highly departmentalised 1/  
and politically-sensitive local authority direct administration.
But this advantage is something of a red herring, for in this context, 
it is the financial and fiscal impediments to accommodation of one 
authority*s overspill in another*s area which are important: who 
is to pay housing subsidies, how are costs of expensive and lumpy 
infrastructure investments to be allocated. Of itself, the corporation 
structure does not resolve these problems, which remain between it and 
all the authorities involved in the transfer. If local authority 
representatives are capable of settling these questions within a 
corporation, they are capable of settling them outside a formal, govern­
ment-approved structure. The value of the corporation envisaged lay 
rather in its independence, and in particular its access to finance 
from the Public Works Loan Board. Power to use this finance to provide 
services and utilities which local authorities felt unable to provide 
was power to override local resource allocation decisions.
Silkin^ and the Government chose not to include provision for 
local authority corporations, for reasons given by Marshall, the 
Parliamentary Secretary, when winding up for the Government at the 
Second Reading:
"The local authority corporations would find it difficult 
to get away from the local outlook. If they did get away 
from the local outlook, they would be on the same level 
as a government-sponsored corporation. The fact is that 
local authorities are not concerned with the building 
of entirely new towns. When they want to build new 
towns they look forward with anticipation to collecting
1• "I can see no hope of a speedy agreement being arrived at between 
an authority desiring to build and the built-in authority." 
(Silkin, Hansard Vol. 422 c 1085, 8th May, 1946)
the rates. They want to own the freehold and link up 
to the parent town with finances, rates and services 
and all sorts of other connections. I have yet to 
learn that the local authorities have expressed any ^
desire to become local authority sponsored corporations.. 
Obviously it is a vase undertaking: it is a national 
undertaking and it can only be carried out by a nationally 
sponsored corporation."
(Hansard, ^ol. 422, p.1182, 8th May 1946)
The public corporation can perhaps be seen as a means of restoring 
the range of powers which had made Howard*s "municipalities" such 
influential machines of development, within tightly-defined geographical 
boundaries. Finance was to be over a 60-year borrowing period, directly 
from the Exchequer. The existing local government structure was not 
entirely replaced, for services and infrastructure would still be 
provided by the appropriate local agency, which could charge for 
services provided in advance of rate revenues, but the corporation 
had power to provide such facilities in default of local agencies, 
and impose some costs on the agency. The burden of cost was to be 
determined by discussion, or in cases of disagreement, arbitrated by 
the Minister. As regards housing subsidies, the practice was that 
equal subsidies were paid from the Exchequer and from the local authority 
out of rates. The arrangement that new town houses should enjoy the 
same Exchequer subsidies as those anywhere else was straightforward, 
but who was to meet the other subsidy? Exporting areas were perhaps 
helping towards a better distribution of population, but for them to 
continue to pay their subsidy on exported population would mean paying 
for the privilege of losing population and rateable value. And for
2. Enthusiasm was not encouraged by the requirement that:
"Local authority sponsored corporations should not provide 
exclusively for population from the areas of the sponsoring 
authorities."
(Reith, Second Interim Report, page 22)
the receiving authority, which might b6 very small in relation to the 
proposed expansion, the acceptance of the subsidy responsibility would 
be financially burdensome, and politically very unpopular - paying for 
the privilege of receiving other areas* (often very unwelcome) problems. 
Joseph Westwood, then Secretary of State for Scotland, made a very 
important point in the debate on the Bill:
"The communities and the local authorities belong to the 
people, not the people to the local authorities. The ^  
whole concept behind this bill is that public enterprise 
should in the national interest carry out in accordance 
with the best planning principles ..."
(Hansard Vol. 422 c 1132, 8th May 1946)
In fact he stated what ought to have been the case. Local 
authority powers to determine who should be eligible for rate-subsidised 
housing had introduced an element of unfreedom into choice of housing 
location. To an extent, local authorities had the power to determine 
those for whom they felt a responsibility. This was not decided on 
the basis of "the best planning principles" but on other factors, 
wuch as length of residence, locality, and whether a change in popu­
lation would mean a net loss or gain of local authority revenue.
For this reason, the task of relocating population according to national 
planning criteria required not only government supervision, but 
correction of local authority "market forces" where these worked 
(through politics or public finance) for other ends. In the specific 
case of housing subsidies, Reith recommended that for houses not 
specifically provided for overspill, the Exchequer subsidy should be 
increased to cover the rate-subsidy element. Where a local authority 
continued to pay the rate subsidy, it would be given rights to nominate 
tenants to be overspilled - in other words another form of selection 
of those for whom responsibility is expressed (Reith, Second Interim 
Report, page 17)* Subsidy payment by exporting authority proved to
be a continuing source of difficulty as it became apparent that a low 
proportion of those moving to new towns were coming from housing 
lists, and that houses vacated by people not on housing lists were 
not always "filtering down" to those on official lists. The diffi­
culties of even such a carefully-devised scheme illustrate how badly 
equipped local authority public finance and political attitudes fit 
them to cope with major planned migration. This remains essentially the 
case for new town planning being a central government responsibility.
As regards formal relationships between government corporations 
and local authorities, Reith was recommended by local authority 
associations that there should be local authority representation on 
development corporations. He chose to ignore this advice, emphasising 
instead public relations rather than representative influence.
"Some members (of the development corporation) should be 
chosen after consultation with local authorities concerned, 
it being necessary to secure local contacts and goodwill, 
but it is essential that no member of the governing body 
should regard himself or act as a delegate of any other 
authority or organisation."
(Reith, Interim Report, page ll)
This contention was accepted by the government, and appointments 
have officially been on the basis of merit alone, although the steadily 
increasing proportion of local political figures appointed suggests 
at least a greater awareness of local sensibilities1 ^
Reith also recommended that:
"It should be obligatory on the corporation to develop 
and maintain co-operative relations with the local 
authority and residents of the area, and to create 
the machinery necessary for that purpose." (ibid, p.ll)
This was not formally required by the Act, and corporations were 
left to devise their own arrangements. Again it is notable that far
more attention was paid to good relations with local authorities as 
time passed. Early relationships tended to range from cool to abysmal.
As to the administrative states^of the growing town, the Committee 
recommended that when population justified it, the town should be 
raised to urban district or burgh status to Mhelp to create a corporate 
feeling in the, new town”. But the responsibility of this corporate \ 
body would be confined to "certain small local services” during develop­
ment; the crucial question was of course what was to happen to the 
agency's assets on completion, This was the single issue on which 
the Committee members disagreed. Should the assets pass to the normal 
representatives of the local public interest - the local authority - 
once the need for the agency's distinctive abilities had passed: or 
were the. dangers in one body being both local authority and land­
lords on such a complete scale such that the agency should revert 
to being the estate owner, representing the public interest in this 
way, and co-operating with the local authority, each in its own 
sphere?
The valuation at which assets would be transferred is also 
important, but attitude to this probably flowed from fundamental 
attitudes to ownership. Those who favoured local authority ownership 
held that any other arrangement was in conflict with democratic traditions 
local authorities would respond to the responsibility presented, and
e
there was no reason to fear ”corrupt" administration. On the other 
hand, ”a large majority of the Committee” (said to be all but one 
member) took the opposite view, thus:
"Though there are at present substantial areas of towns 
owned by local authorities, there is no case where 
the entire area of a town is so owned. The problems ^  
which are inseparable from monopoly might present 
themselves here; and continuity of policy in the 
management of the estate might be endangered by the 
changes of personnel natural to an proper in a 
publicly-elected body”.
(Reith, Second Interim Report, page 2l)
The Government disagreed, and the Act provided that towns when 
"substantially complete" should be transferred to the local authority. 
The only fear of Conservatives was that a government might prove 
tardy, leaving substantial assets in the hands of bureaucratic 
nationalised ownership, which they disliked. Their attitude radically 
changed during the 1950s but their fear was of "problems of monopoly": 
one wonders how many would have openly accepted Reith's view that 
elected government was bad for the conduct of affairs, because it 
threatened "continuity of management"! It is fair to note that the 
Committee spent little time on this problem, since they had every reason 
to believe that it would be settled as part of a general land policy. 
This proved not to be so, and the substantial achievements of the 
new town corporations (about which many were doubtful in 1946) made 
the principle of ownership important in later years.
In many ways, the Committee tackled the administrative problems 
of new town creation as fully as could be expected in a discussion 
of principle, and what emerged was an effective set of administrative 
arrangements. But the outcome was heavily influenced by the nature 
of the towns which were seen as the objective, and this was an issue 
not up for discussion.
The Committee's Report begins with a forthright statement on the 
function of the new town:
"The twin evils of slums and overcrowding date mainly 
from the early years of the last century. They have 
their roots in the unregulated and excessive growth of 
towns during a period when the health of the people, 
no less than their spiritual and social well-being, 
were sacrificed to industrial progress. Men must 
live near their work. Yet only in recent years has 
come a full realisation that the solution of the 
many problems to which these evils give rise, to say 
nothing of the spoliation of the countryside by ill- 
considered building, is by setting some limit to the 
haphazard sprawl of our existing cities and by providing
in new towns, wisely sited and skilfully planned, 
a proper balance between housing and industry."
(Reith, Interim Report, page 5)
Why is it not possible to plan skilfully balanced housing and 
industry within existing settlements? Are all towns excessively 
large? If not, by what characteristics can excessive size be recognised? 
These questions were not tackled, yet the Committee felt confident 
in prescribing small units:
"Beyond a certain point the appropriate balance between industry 
and housing is hard to maintain, the interval distances 
become too great, the open country is too remote from 
the centre, and the sense of corporate living and responsi­
bility is lost." (ibid. page 4)
Each of these points is open to question. The "certain point" 
which the Committee envisaged was at most 80,000: why should it become 
any more difficult to maintain equality in provision of houses and 
jobs at this point - or indeed any point (assuming that this is what 
is meant by "balance")? It has already been shown that Barlow was 
given that even in unplanned conurbations, increasing size need not mean 
longer work journeys: co-ordinated location of houses, employment and 
services in new towns could presumably enable an even better combination 
of choice and accessibility. Was there ever any evidence that people 
with gardens placed high value on open countryside within walking 
distance? Finally, quite apart from the question of what jLs a sense 
of corporate living and responsibility, what -evidence was there that 
it diminished when a town reached 80,000 population or whatever?
Particular emphasis was laid on separation from existing cities 
by a green belt:
".. development ... sufficiently far out to constitute a new 
town within our terms of reference (would require) ... 
a very considerable area of intervening green belt land ••
(ibid. page 2)
The justification for these (self-appointed) "terms of reference" 
is not stated. But the reasons for preference for substantially green­
field sites rather than expansion of existing settlements, are more 
fully stated and open to comment. The Committee felt that:
a) Many small towns were not suitable on the basis for larger 
development (True, but many were: no one claimed that because 
all open land was not suitable, none should be considered)
b) Existing settlement patterns would impose constraints on planners 
(True, but how important a factor is this)
c) Existing businessmen etc. would be disturbed (Considerate 
compensation would be required, just as for displaced landowners 
everywhere)•
d) Existing services cannot always be extended, nor is there always 
economy in doing so. (This would be a matter of individual 
estimation, not a general rule. Against this, early inhabitants 
would suffer great inconvenience until the 'threshold' for each 
service was attained. Faced with this in practice, some new 
town enthusiasts claimed that common deprivation was good for the 
pioneering spirit, not an outlook which welfare economists proved 
quick in adopting.
e) There is unlikely to be spare labour or housing.
The interesting fact is that all the important issues were 
neglected, and have since proved decisive in the tendency towards 
development of larger initial units. The benefits of ideal final 
balance of jobs and services are less impressive when people must ^  
tolerate lack of choice for many years. New towns are less dependent 
on immigrant firms when existing firms can respond more incrementally 
to changing conditions. A better choice of employment is immediately 
available in addition to existing towns. Open-minded experiment
has shown that the difficulties of integrating future plans with 
existing forms are not insuperable - and so on. The Committee 
showed a determination not to consider satisfactory anything but 
a classic intellectual planned community - small, highly-ordered, 
comprehensible, clearly-bounded and self-contained.
"Our responsibility, as we see it, is rather to conduct 
an essay in civilisation, by siezing an opportunity 
to design, evolve and carry into execution for the 
benefit of coming generations the means for a happy 
and spacious, way of life. It is in that spirit that 
we approach our task." (ibid. page 4)
It was not expected thatactuality should always correspond to 
this ideal state - the point was that it ought to. Reith drew on 
an old tradition, but it was misleading to claim that Howard's ideas 
were being put into practice. While each garden city (and even each 
ward) had a degree of self-containment, Howard's construct was based 
on a hierarchy of interdependence. The town cluster he outlined had 
a Central City of 58,000 plus six garden cities of 32,000, which gave 
a total of some 250,000 (remarkably similar to the Milton Keynes 
proposal!). This population was spread evenly, with green spaces 
too narrow to be regarded as green belts in Reith's terms. Each part 
of the cluster had fast rail (update as "motorway") links with each 
other, and the town cluster would have been a place of a great deal 
of commuting, as residents each traded off width of job choice and 
ease of access, and changed job and moved house. As Hall (1973) 
remarks, the cluster would have functioned like Los Angeles, and 
looked more like it than the Reithian garden city.
In the search for visible self-containment, Reith raised the 
size of the single unit, and perhaps fell between two stools, not 
accepting the dispersed social city, but not able to achieve fast 
enough growth at the single point to ensure width of choice, at 
least not initially. It follows from this that Howard's construct
was more dynamic# Continuous adaptation to growing population and 
changed conditions is possible by cell-like generation of new garden 
cities, which in themselves offer the integrated provision of homes 
and services, but are still sufficiently linked to the town cluster 
to allow maximum width of choice in higher-level services and employ­
ment#
By contrast, garden city development as envisaged by Reith and 
many others like him is a much more static and once-for-all business#
New towns are deliberately placed beyond convenient travelling distance, 
and the emphasis is on eventually reaching an ideal combination 
of good environment and accessibility to opportunities# There is 
confidence that the technical and social conditions which determine 
the ideal will remain constant, so that sacrifices involved in reaching 
the ideal (such as poor choice of employment or services) can confidently 
be made# Arguably, Reith and Abercrombie underestimated the sophisti­
cation of people's demands of their community facilities# They certainly 
overestimated the importance placed on simpler pleasures (such as 
evening strolls in open countryside) and were not mentally equipped 
to cope with the implications of widespread car ownership* Their 
model of change was "static equilibrium" - a period of hectic trans­
formation, followed by decades of technical and social standstill.
"Some of the most active propagandists of that period 
indeed positively argued that rapid change itself 
was bad, since it set up pressures which could not 
easily be accommodated in an orderly planned way#"
(Hall, 1973, page 45)
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They certainly contemplated no population growth, which was quite * 
different from the situation which Howard responded to, and to actual 
conditions, until 1970 at any rate#
of marginal adaptation, aiming at "improvement", but never in the 
belief that it is anything but a moving, fickle target, is put at a 
discount, and there is impatience with the agencies - such as local 
authorities - which practise it* Clearnninded purposive agencies 
are not regarded as replacing existing local authorities, but simply 
superintending this limited period of intense change, then handing 
back the new situation for minor supervision.
The new towns administrative machinery combined several features 
of British intellectual attitudes. First, the traditional view of the 
Utopian town as the quintescence of planning, and second, what Meyerson 
and Banfield (1965) called the "unitary" view of administration.
This assumes a Rousseau-like notion of the general good, to which 
all other interests must be subordinated.
"Such an approach tends to an extremely lofty, yet 
imprecise definition of the public good in terms 
of ends with infinite values, which are ideologically 
derived and are characteristically presented in terms 
of the absolute virtue of a concrete set of policy 
measures"
"The unitary approach ... achieves the rare feat of 
being both non-rational and undemocratic."
(Hall, 1973, pp 69-7°)
The opposite view is the "utilitarian", in which the welfare 
of individuals and groups is seen to differ and practical resolution 
of conflicts determines policy. It is:
"a view held by lower- and lower middle-class people, 
who may find that the rough and tumble of the party 
political machine politics give them a better 
approximation to what they want"
(ibid. page 69).
Lord Reith was"perhaps the most celebrated exponent of the 
1
unitary approach" and both the new town as described by him and approved
1 • Consider the similarities between the BBC and the New Town Development 
Corporation as envisaged by Reith, not only in the machinery of 
administration, but the fundamental uplifting purpose of each.
See Reith "Into the Wind" pp 95-101.
in legislation were expressions of the approach applied to planning.
"Howard's ideas ... were turned into a fixed blueprint 
for the future: a design solution par excellence" 
(ibid. page 45)
The highly autonomous, centrally-appointed and backed public 
corporation was a unitary device in the classic British tradition 
(how Edwin Chadwick would have enjoyed being a Development Corporation 
Chairman!)
"The new legislation relied on a different set of premises.
Local and national policy was to decide the essential 
character of the community in advance. Private decisions 
were to be made within the framework of an overall plan 
which embodied these social goals ... The city was no 
longer to be an incidental by-product of countless 
individual decisions made in the market with other 
ends in view."
(Rodwin, 1956, page 39)
Throughout planning in 1946 there was an assumption that private 
enterprise was to be held firmly in check: it was local authority 
laissez-faire which the Reithians looked forward to controlling.
It might seem paradoxical that a measure with so little popular support 
should move so smoothly through formulation and debate: the reason is 
the support for the unitary view among the"ruling classes". Schaffer 
(a planning civil servant) puts across their temper expressively:
"It is little wonder that new town proposals sometimes 
produce fierce opposition. This is no new problem.
The conflict between old and new preservation and change, 
stagnation and progress is the whole drama of history."
(Schaffer, 1970, page 21)
Local government members (and indeed M.Ps) are elected to represent 
an assortment of utilitarian points of view, and conflict between 
unitary men of action and utilitarian local interests was inevitable. 
Advance warning was given by the intense local opposition to 
designation of Stevenage, planned before the Act was passed. In
the House of Commons, Viscount Hinchingbrook (Dorset South) drew 
attention to the flaw in the unitary approach:
"The Minister of Town and Country Planning commended this 
Bill to the House in a felicitous speech to which tribute 
has been paid by Hon* Members on all sidesl ••• We have 
had experience of his amiabilities in this House for a great 
many years, but the strange thing is, that when the 
Minister goes outside into the countryside in order to 
prosecute his aims he finds the Englishman unaccountably 
in opposition to him."
(Hansard Vol. 422, c 1147, 8th May 1946)
This indeed appeared to be the case: opposition to the initial 
designations and the subsequent resource requirements of the early 
new towns was so intense, and the resulting performance vis a vis 
the house-building efforts of local authorities so poor, that the 
survival of the towns must be attributed largely to the indomitable 
will of Silkin himself. Residents of Stevenage had their finger 
close to the heart of things when they renamed their station "SILKINGRAD" 
as part of their campaign against designation. The working out of the 
new town ideal in reality concerned even liberal spirits who were 
basically sympathetic, such as E. M. Forster, again discussing 
Stevenage:
"Life went on there as usual until this spring. Then 
someone ... was casually informed that ... the whole 
area had been commandeered. Commandeered for what?
Had not the war ended? Appropriate officials from 
the Ministry of Town and Country Planning now arrived 
from London and announced that a satellite town for 
60,000 people is to be built ... Meterorite town 
would be a better name. It has fallen out of a blue 
sky."
(Forster, 1946, p.67)
Apart from the redoubtable Hinchingbrook, M.Ps during debate
1 • Hinchingbrook was the only M.P. to pppose the Bill which 
passed without a division, on robust root-and-branch 
principles.
did not raise such objections, but instead pointed in sorrow, rather 
than anger at the difficulties which the new town machinery opened 
up. Mr. Nally, a Manchester M.P. pointed out that self-contained 
independent new towns cut across "big city ambitions" and tendencies 
of "cannibalism" which united all parties. W. S. Morrison raised the 
fear of neglect of old towns, and hoped that new town development was 
not going to be like the Mad Hatter's Tea Party, moving on to virgin 
land,leaving the exhausted "place settings" to decline. Colonel Clarke 
questioned how adjoining local authorities were to bear the expenses 
imposed upon them, to which Silkin replied:
"So far as other services are concerned, I cannot see 
exactly what would be the repercussions on outside 
authorities, but I shall be very happy to discuss 
the matter with the Hon. and gallant member at a 
later stage."
(Hansard, ibid. col. 1092)
which indicates the extent to which Parliament could only discuss, and 
influence the broad principles on which administrations would woik, 
and could not possibly determine the precise role of new towns in 
planning as a whole, at this stage. Mrs. Mann, a veteran campaigner 
ft>r new towns in Scotland, warned that cities were almost irrational 
in their attachment to population, often at the same time excusing 
high-density building on the grounds that people had to live close 
to employment, and demanding even more employment! Mr. Irving complained 
of the undemocratic nature of the development corporation - the local 
authority of Tottenham (which he represented) had been amicably working 
out details of a garden city scheme for Harlow, and he felt that this 
avenue ought to be left open.
Perhaps it is indicative of the nature of the discussion of 
(and hence commitment to) new towns, that finance, in the sense of the 
total cost, is almost entirely neglected. Reith had claimed that no 
extra expense was involved, since construction would be carried out
in any case. New towns v/ere as cheap as any other arrangement, quite 
consistent with the efficiency in allocation of investment which the 
Committee required. No evidence of this was presented, but more 
importantly, no guidelines were set as to the scope of costs and benefits 
to be taken into account, to enable decisions on form of development 
to be taken in specific cases. (Perhaps one does not think in such 
terms when embarking upon essays in civilisation, but nevertheless 
the claim was made, and not vindicated ). Hinchingbrook was left 
to question the claim of £19 million for 12,000 new town houses, or 
about £1500 each: was this really enough, he asked, to provide not 
only a house,but the degree of civilised life the Minister had depicted?
And so it was that Parliament, having committed itself to the 
seductive unitary view of new towns without enquiring the price, was 
sharply brought to heel by the staggering amounts of resources they 
required (as revealed by the Public Accounts Committee), and by 
acrimonious ("utilitarian”) disagreements over the allocation of 
costs among the - sometimes unwilling - participants.
Can the quiescence of Parliament in the face of local authority 
reserve and popular apathy be explained by members feeling that they 
were no more than supporting noble general principles which would 
prove unrealistic anyway? The background to the Act was very much
1. There are, after all, some simple reasons for new town provision 
being more expensive - such as heavy advance investment in 
infrastructure, which would remain underused for many years: 
this is costly in resources.
2. The acceptance of town development as a cut-price compromise was 
not a party matter. Although the Conservatives introduced the 
Town Development Act, it was clear that their Labour predecessors 
were working along much the same lines.
Metropolitan - it was hurried through Parliament to allow the commence­
ment of Stevenage. It was widely accepted - notably by the LCC - 
that London needed new towns: this was not controversial, and all 
the mainstream new towns until 1961 had been determined by studies 
already carried out and widely accepted.
The Act merely serviced decisions made outside the centralised 
planning machinery.
But did the Government1 s intention go further (and so beyond 
what was acceptable in practice to M.Ps as representatives of con­
stituencies)? In later years Silkin claimed that he had thought that 
20 new towns would be needed, and reflected that by the mid-sixties 
he had been proved correct. This is rather misleading: what he told 
the House in opening for the Government that initially 20 would be 
required, the implication being that more would follow as work comparable 
■to Abercrombie*s was done elsewhere. An exchange between Silkin and 
the Advisory Committee on London Regional Planning (which represented 
local authorities and their planning officials) is revealing for it 
shows that even although the new town ideal was receiving overwhelming 
approbation in Parliament, practical planners (as well as local 
authority members) could look at the same situation, with the same 
objectives of quality of environment and access to opportunities, and 
come to quite different conclusions as to the role of the new town.
"In the process of investigating the various centres of 
population in the Greater London Area, it was brought 
home to us that in a large number of existing towns, 
redistributed population could be received to a greater 
extent than proposed in the Plan (i.e. Abercrombie*s) 
and yet larger additions could still be integrated with 
the existing centres so as to form reasonably balanced 
communities. This also appears to be the view generally 
shared by the Constituent Authorities. Furthermore, 
as a result of our investigations we have reached the 
conclusion that new towns cannot be .justified solely as 
being necessary to accommodate redistributed populations, 
because the whole of the redistribution could if necessary
be effected in the existing communities within 50 miles 
of London. We agree however that a certain amount of 
redistribution could be dealt with by the development 
of new towns, as these will have intrinsic planning 
advantages and will form valuable examples for guidance 
in planning extensions of existing towns. In all cases 
we have kept in view the need for work to be provided 
near at hand for the redistributed -persons."
(Advisory Committee. Report to the Minister, Para 26)
To which Silkin replied:
the Minister regards the jrovision of new towns as 
an essential part of the regrouping of the population 
and not merely as a valuable example in planning; and 
... as laready stated, the Minister is generally unable 
to accept the expansions which the sub-committee 
recommended in the Green Belt.”
(Memorandum by the Minister ..on the Report of the 
Advisory Committee ... Para 19)
The point is of course that the agencies involved did not 
have identical aims, for Silkin and the new town advocates sought the 
balance of amenity and opportunity only within the context of the 
traditional ideal town: this as the Advisory Committee probably 
realised, was the special justification for new towns, and the con­
comitant central agencies, but they could accept neither ideal nor 
machinery. In the long run, Silkin was proved wrong, and the Advisory 
Committee remarkably prescient. Only a fraction of relocation both 
in the private and public sectors, took place in new towns, and the
"idealists”proved not to hare the political weight to enforce the new
, X
town ideal, or justify its costliness. L'It proved to be the case that 
the experiments in town design and organisation were the most sig­
nificant contributions of the new towns to post-war British planning.
Perhaps the last word should be left to Viscount Hinchingbrook, 
the only man in Parliament to roundly condemn the case for the ideal 
town and its ideal administrations:
"Who are the Corporation? They are an oligarchy of nine 
men who are going to rule the roost at Stevenage and 
in other toms. They are the creatures of the Minister.
They are appointed by the Minister. They are responsible 
to no one but the Minister, and are given enormous powers.
It scarcely needs the acquisition of pistols to turn these 
gentlemen into the bosses of Wild West towns of gold 
rush times.
One day the spirit of independence of the Englishmen will rouse 
itself to a fever pitch and will wake these planners out of 
their dreams.
... members of Parliament who with their friends and associates 
outside Parliament do not fully understand the Bill and do not 
like the smell of it. They are nevertheless more powerful 
politically in the long run."
So unreal was the rest of the discussion that it was this eccentric 
who was proved correct in the fulness of time.
NE;7 TOWNS: THE PUBLIC EXPOSURE
"The New Towns Act is a wonderfully complete and 
flexible piece of legislation, and the single-minded 
development corporation an inherently effective 
instrument of public purpose"
(W. Thomas, 1972, page 46)
An easily recognisable statement of the Reithian unitary view, 
characteristic of the New Town Bill debate. But when the Act began 
to operate in the outside world, other questions became important: 
"which public?"; "which purpose?" The Act was badly fitted to tackle 
these types of problem. Perhaps because of the heavy Metropolitan 
bias in most protagonists1 thinking, the Act worked as though strategic 
plans such as the Greater London Plan would provide the basic planning 
input. It would then build on the broad agreement that "x" new towns 
would be required, and provide the machinery for the quick and 
satisfactory achievement of the objective. The Act itself could not 
define the new towns required, but it gave no help in setting out the 
range of factors which were to be taken into account in deciding 
between new town development and other forms. Nor did it indicate 
the institutional framework within which consideration was to take 
place (cf the Marley and Barlow proposals). It offered no guide to 
how a determinate new town policy would be formulated. How then 
would plans emerge?
The 1947 Act gave local authorities responsibility for planning, 
and the Government apparently felt this would be the source, since:
"... the county councils have become firmly established 
as the local planning authorities for their areas, and 
are carrying out the surveys prescribed by the 1947 
Act, it is expected that the first proposals for sites 
will come from them, either on their own initiative 
or in conjunction with their urban neighbours."
(Town and Country Planning 1943-51» page 123)
The initial experience suggested that this might be so.
Stevenage, Peterlee and Basildon originated partly from local 
authority overtures. Corby, Aycliffe and Glenrothes were also seen
by local authorities as cases where the new town machinery could
/
tackle difficult planning problems. But behind this early
’•i ■
appearance lay the reality that the urban/rural division in British 
administration had been built into the planning system.
"Howard saw that there was no solution to the city's 
problems within the existing framework of municipal 
administration because one of its greater problems 
was the lack of economic and social and political 
relation to the surrounding countryside. What Howard 
said about the relation of town and country is equally 
applicable to the entire business of city and regional 
planning: the administrative unit that is created must 
be capable of embracing both the urban and rural aspects 
of the regions."
(Mumford, 1945, p.35)
This condition was not met in 1947* But there was a second point 
at which the integration of new town and overall planning could take 
place - namely through the function of the Ministry to approve 
plans, and ensure that a coherent rational policy emerged. This assumes 
the Ministry'c capacity to formulate a model national development 
plan against which to measure local authority submissions. The 
Ministry itself minimised its function in doing this:
•
"Will plans of this kind dovetail into a sensible pattern 
of land use for the whole of England and Wales? •• the 
greater part of the work of dovetailing and reconciling 
plans must be left to the local planning authorities 
themselves••"
(Town and Country Planning, 1943-51, page 25-26)
The possibility of either source producing strategic plans, to 
develop a coherent?, and continuing strategy of new town designation, 
was dismissed by an American' commentator:
".. such co-ordination as occurs is the result of 
ad hoc consultation between senior civil servants 
and the more powerful local planning authorities.
In the latter case, the conflict of interest between 
great cities such as Manchester and Liverpool, and 
their respective county planning authorities throws 
the burden of co-ordination in many cases on the 
central government... In sum, despite the great 
strides which have obviously been taken, it seems 
fair to conclude that effective town planning 
will await an intensive overhaul of the national 
and regional machinery which presently seeks to 
co-ordinate Whitehall and the local planner."
(Presthus, 1952, page 487).
In itself, the young Ministry had not the expertise to fashion 
a continuing new towns policy out of the submissions which is pro­
cessed - even if these had been a suitable vehicle for carrying 
such a policy. Moreover even a coherent national strategic plan at 
Ministry level would not have been sufficient, for many other more 
important departments were inevitably involved. The Treasury, the 
Board of Trade withats crucial industrial location powers; the 
Ministry of Works, in control of the distribution of scarce building 
resources; the Ministry of Transport; the Ministry of Housing and 
Local Government; the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. Each 
of these had sectional interests which often were inconsistent . 
with the objectives of new town developments. The problem with im­
pulses so "unitary" as the new town philosophy is that they must expose 
themselves in the "utilitarian" market place - which in Britain des­
cribes the process of central government. It might be expected 
that "the Government" would be capable of fashioning a corporate 
programme in which elements such as new towns, would be integrated, 
and then given continuing support. In fact this is not the case: 
much administration is done (as Mr. Crossman has recently shown) 
by inter-departmental committees of officials, which,reflecting 
the Cabinet itself, are "utilitarian" bargaining places where
conflicts are resolved. They do not operate as corporate policy 
formulation bodies - hence the need for the Central Policy Review 
Staff.
This was the environment in which the. established new towns 
had to operate, and in which a continuing policy of designation 
would be formulated. It was naive for new town advocates to demand 
(as they continue to) that once a town had been designated, it 
should be guaranteed the resources (not only money, but industrial 
development certificates and so on) to carry through the task.
This is particularly the case when new towns were designated with 
no thoroughly worked out concept of what the resource costs might 
be, and exactly who would be forced to meet the costs.
Each of the new towns found their progress impeded by difference 
of opinion with other central agencies: one thinks of the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Fisheries1 objections to Basildon's sewerage 
schemes, which threatened local oyster beds, or the protracted 
disagreement with the Coal Board at Peterlee, about the effects 
of town design of coal accessibility. These delays and others 
like them invariably infuriated the "men of action" who constituted 
the Corporations, but the effect for the people at large was that 
it was several years before the new towns began to make, a significant 
contribution to house-provision. During this period the new towns 
were substantially out-performed by local authorities' piece­
meal additions to their stock, a fact which must have done much 
to foster support for town expansion schemes.
If it is surprising that central government proved so poor 
at integrating its new town policy with its other strategies, 
then it is not surprising at all that the new towns had serious
difficulties in dealing with local authorities. Perhaps the 
emphasis on autonomy of corporations and self-containment of 
developments led people to underestimate the extent to which 
new towns would depend on other agencies:
"Development corporations cannot build such ’complete1 
towns by themselves: they lack the staff, the ^
organisation, the experience, and the financial 
resources or subsidies. To a much larger extent 
than is often realised, their task is to enlist the 
help of other organisations, private or public, that 
can provide these types of assistance."
(Rodwin, 1956, p.58)
A high degreecf sympathetic co-operation with local authorities 
was required. And since there was no formal structure for bringing 
forward new town proposals, the attitude of local authorities 
would be influenced by their collective experience. By and 
large this was not fruitful. The distinction between "unitary" 
and "utilitarian" is very much one of temperamental attitudes 
to the conduct of public business, and these differences can be 
seen in the new town administrators' lack of sympathy with the 
concerns and sensibilities of local authorities. Different 
aspects of this emerged in different towns. Peterlee's local 
councillors found development corporation staff aloof and rather 
contemptuous - from a very different social and intellectual 
background. At Aycliffe, the effect of development on nearby 
urban centres was a political issue. At Basildon, Essex County 
Council had difficulty in providing educational facilities, 
at Harlow, roads and sewerage proved sources of conflict and 
delay - and so on. These were issues of substance, made more 
difficult by the insensitive methods adopted at the top. Silkin's 
conduct of the Stevenage issue was a model of how to make enemies 
and antagonise everyone. The local authority and residents were
unnecessarily denied information. After a stormy public meeting, 
he refused to meet council representatives. He refused to consider 
changes in the designated area, yet gave no reason for the Ministry's 
intransigence. He refused to take local sentiment into account in 
appointing corporation members - and so on. The designation started 
off as a local authority initiative, but was finally opposed, right 
to the House of Lords, where Silkin won, but:
"Considering the initial objectives, it was a Pyrrhic 
victory. Instead of a model town, the programme 
turned into a frustrating failure, with the Stevenage 
Corporation in the position of a successful occupying 
power. Development was practically at a standstill.
The lessons were all negative: a record of how things 
should not have beenI"
(Rodwin, 1956, p.96)
This is particularly sad, because Stevenage was the symbolic 
prototype new town. It could have served as a model of how the 
Government would respond to local authorities' planning initiatives.
The model instead had a quite negative effect.
The attitude of Silkin was reflected in individual new town 
personnel. In 1949 Crawley Development Corporation printed in anguish 
a list of the bodies they had to consult with. Sir Ernest Gowers 
(former civil servant and advocate of plain words) of Harlow complained 
of "machinery .. cumbrous almost past belief" (Rodwin, 195 6. PP 73-5). 
There is to-day a greater sympathy with the political constraints 
within which local authorities operate, but one can still sense 
contempt for local politics and government among corporations (at 
least in private)-an incompetent nuisance which people who should realise 
that the corporation knows best perversely cling to. The essay of 
Wyndham Thomas (1972) captures the flavour well:
"Getting your new town build... is also an exercise in 
engineering a variety of consents .. (p*49)
It is particularly important to inform, consult, 
involve and if at all possible enthuse local 
authorities (p.50)
Ky personal conclusion is that public participation 
in plan-making ... is a costly and largely fruitless 
exercise ..as one general manager puts it 'sympathetic 
efficiency* (i.e. 'benevolent despotism'?)
... will give the overwhelming majority all the 
participation they want." (pp. 51-2).
That said, it is undoubtedly true that relations between corporations 
and local authorities have improved immeasurably since the '40s and 
'50s. The practice of appointing local political figures to corporations 
is well-established, and it may be that Thomas is a "Mark I Corporation 
Member" - certainly few would give support publicly to his sentiments.
As regards financial arrangemmts, there is greater sympathy in 
recognising and accommodating local authorities' valid concerns - 
for example by the "no profit - no loss'* arrangement, by which corporations 
lend money to cover costs during the initial unremunerative period, 
and the local authorities pay back the sum once the provision produces 
revenue•
This is to anticipate, for the experience of the first five 
years gave no such hope for the future. For the established towns, 
this was a result of imposing a "unitary" vision on a sea quite 
storm-tossed by "utilitarian" conflicts - within government, within 
local government and between both. For the prospect of a continuing 
programme, the Act itself set up no mechanism for achieving it; the 
workings of the planning machinery could not produce it; and the 
experience of the first towns did not encourage it. The partial 
nature of the new town construct is evident in the painful contrast 
between the planning inside the towns, and the chaos all around:
"In these planned towns a bewildering variety of 
unanticipated problems have cropped up during
the early years. They were not the physical problems, 
like subsidence, that are the raw materials with which 
planners must work. Instead they were problems that 
revealed the weakness of the broader economic policies 
and relationships, of the administrative machinery, and 
particularly of the corrective devices. The problems 
have appeared under many guises: in public understanding, 
in resolving conflicts of interests, in administrative 
flexibility, in co-ordination of inconsistent ministerial 
policies, in financial formulas... in setting or achieving 
objectives. As a consequence, the first model towns 
became examples of bad practice. Towns that started 
with grass-roots support for a long time steadily lost 
that support ... The planning mechanism has shown 
embarrassing failures in forethought. Comprehensive 
planning has not proved comprehensive; and to the extent 
that it has, equally comprehensive problems have been 
generated for which the planners were often unprepared."
(Rodwin, 1956, p.129)*
Add to this the poor performance of the new towns as against 
local authority housing efforts, and the realisation, through the 
reports of the Public Accounts Committee, of the true cost of new 
towns, and the fact that only one town was designated by the Con- 
servatices (who were not opposed in principle) until 1961, is not 
surprising. The exception is itself significant: Scotland, because 
of the separateness and more "corporate" nature of its domestic 
administration (plus the continuous concern for regional prosperity) 
sustained an /interest in regional strategic -planning, and it was 
from this concern that Cumbernauld emerged in 1955* There was no such 
machinery or concern in England, at least until I960.
New Towns and the Urban Areas
One of the most important conflicts which new towns experienced 
was with the local authorities whose overcrowding they were intended 
to relieve. The problem of accommodating the overcrowded was two­
fold. First, new towns were intended to be socially "balanced".
Therefore they could not devote themselves entirely, or even sub- ^  
stantially, to housing the overcrowded. Second, they were intended 
to be self-sufficient, and so the emphasis was put on ensuring that 
only those who worked in new towns would be housed in them, tfhen the 
majority of inhabitants moved with their firms, it would be entirely 
fortuitous if some had been previously in housing stress.
The Industrial Selection Scheme was devised to use the remaining 
houses to help those in housing need, but the emphasis remained 
primarily on aptitude for employment, so that it was the nature of 
the firms moving to the towns, and the labour they selected, which 
determined who was rehoused.
New town supporters continue to stress that while the most 
overcrowded may not be helped directly, if the vacated housing "filters 
down", then overcrowding must be relieved. The problem is that if 
there is movement in to reoccupy property which has been vacated, 
then the overcrowding and housing stress which local authorities must 
cope with is not lessened. This became a pressing issue when local 
authorities were paying a rate fund contribution to new towns or 
expanded towns on behalf of - people they exported. Cullingworth (1959) 
found that in East Ham 44^ of vacated houses were reoccupied by people 
from other areas. Although many of these were in housing need, so ^  
far as East Ham was concerned, it was paying in order to relieve 
housing need elsewhere. For it, the important variable was the amount 
of property: unless it was cut down, then the basic position would ^  
not change. As explained in the final chapter, the cost of extinguishing 
land uses was crucial to decongestion. It was substantial, and should 
in logic have been met from the betterment resulting from development 
elsewhere. It was not, and this represented first,in aggregate terms
an under-statement of the resource cost of new and expanded towns: 
and second, a weakness in the distribution of the costs and benefits 
of development.
These financial considerations aside, the question of new town 
help for the most needy in cities remains controversial. Deakin, and 
Ungerson (1972) demonstrated that even with substantial changes in 
the operation of the Industrial Selection Scheme, only of Londoners 
reached new towns by it. They saw little scope for fundamental 
improvement:
"Seen from our perspective, the chief source of difficulty 
appeared to be the elementary one of incompatibility 
between the two key objectives in the scheme, of satisfying 
employers* needs and meeting London housing needs."
(ibid. page 25)•
The Department of Employment told the Expenditure Committee 
(H.C. 1973-74, 18-iv, q 708-712) that 21,563 were on the ISS register 
in London, and that in 1972, only 591 had been placed in new towns. 
Moreover housing need was not the primary concern in selection:
"So the housing requirements are taken into account, 
though one would not put it very much higher than 
that? - Not in the final analysis, It does not 
rest with the Department of Employment to select 
someone."
(ibid. q. 729).
It is difficult to see that new or expanded towns can afford 
concentrations of disadvantaged, unskilled and poorly-paid people 
any more than London Boroughs can, but ways in which the relationships 
between new towns and exporting local authorities might be improved 
are explored in the final chapter.
The Town Development Act
After the suspension of an active new towns policy, the Con­
servative Government in 1952 passed the Town Development Act^•
This sought to achieve the substantial advantages of new town develop­
ment, within the normal local authority structure, by encouraging 
overcrowded areas to make arrangements with other local authorities 
to receive population. The provisions made were partly financial 
and partly administrative. Either exporting or importing authority 
could build: the normal exchequer rent contribution would be payable, 
but in addition, for a period of years the exporting authority would 
pay its rate fund contribution to the importing authority, and in 
return receive the right to nominate tenants for houses.
In some ways the project was the better of the chastening 
new town experience. It was based on giving support to voluntary 
agreements between local authorities: it was less costly in resources, 
requiring only marginal additions to capital stock (presumably in 
towns whose primary infrastructure had spare capacity): greater 
emphasis was placed on resolution of differences before designation, 
and on using the network of relationships which was already in existence.
In other ways it suffered from the same limitations as the New 
Town programme. The act facilitated co-operation once the -programme 
of co-operation had been formulated, but could do less to initiate 
strategic relocation. There would be no assurance, for example, tX 
that the areas prepared to accept population were the areas best placed 
to receive it - either from the point of view of physical accommodation 
or of industrial development. There was no attempt to dovetail
1. The previous Labour administration had been in the process of 
formulating a similar piece of legislation.
government industrial location policy and relocation patterns.
As with the new town policy, there was no accounting calculus or 
administrative machinery devised to ensure that the distribution 
of costs and benefits was fair, and encouraged movement towards a 
better spread of population (however that was determined!).
Just as the New Towns Act had been based on a strategic planning 
exercise which would not (without government intervention) become the 
general pattern,the Town Development Act was based on two similar 
developments. The first was again in London, where the LCC had been 
working on a number of overspill schemes to supplement the tardy new 
town developments. The second was in Lancashire. Salford had serious 
problems of overcrowding, but wholesale annexations of surrounding 
areas were out of the question. Lancashire County Council moved 
in as mediators, and helped to conduct discussions between Selford 
and Worsley, which was willing to expand, but had neither the resources 
not staff to cope. There is no doubt that the Lancashire example 
influenced the emergence of the Town Development policy:
"The arrangements made between Salford • • and V/orsley, 
assisted by the Lancashire County Council, is .an 
example of the kind of scheme which I want to promote 
and assist under the Bill. That scheme is taking 
people through the voluntary unaided efforts of the 
three authorities working together. I believe that 
what Lancashire does to-day .. England does to-morrow."
(Hansard, March 26, 1952, p.180).
The important point is that the quality of the arrangements being 
organised by London and Lancashire County Councils depended on their 
being able to act as though they were strategic planning authorities. 
The Town Development Act serviced sound plans already formulated, 
and provided no mechanism by which similar strategic plans could be 
generated and tested elsewhere. The New Toxms Act fell into disuse
partly because the positive input, in the form of Abercrombie-type 
plans, was not forthcoming. The Lancashire-type strategic plans 
proved equally unique.
The results of this were two-fold. Much of the development which 
might have been expected had there been a formal study of population 
location patterns (either at county, regional or national levels of 
responsibility) did not take place. Sometimes this was because of 
’’selfish" protection of interests - as in the case of counties' 
reluctance to take overspill. More often it was because there was 
no process of supervised appraisal of interests and potential in the 
field of strategic redistribution of population. This would have 
been a task for central government, but during the '50s, government 
interest in regional planning was at a low ebb, and it unfortunately 
took the shock of the Wythall inquiry, concerned with distribution 
of population in the West Midlands, to arouse concern once again.
For Wythall was more than anything an indictment of Government neglect 
of the situation and consequent failure to act, either by new town 
designation or by fostering expanded town arrangements vigorously.
The limited nature of the Town Development Act (essentially the 
absence of a positive policy of strategic planning to accompany they 
supportive measures) represented a lost opportunity. The New Towns 
Act was a tacit acceptance that because of the "market imperfections" - 
fiscal, psychological, economic etc. - local authorities on their own 
had no incentive to attain an optimum distribution (however determined) 
of population. The centralist device adopted was not capable of 
achieving the distribution, but a system re-integrated with local 
authority jurisdiction might - but not without a device for exposing 
mal-distribution and devising improvement.
The second result of the Act was that often its use was an
administrative device for carrying on the inter-war pattern of suburban 
sprawl:
"... most (of the provincial schemes) are small-scale schemes 
which represent little more than house-building on the 
other side of the borough boundary. The important point 
is that these latter schemes are more than likely to result 
in commuting back into the conurbation to work. They are the 
very reverse of self-contained and balanced development."
(Hall, 1973, p.356)1
Where overspill agreements were more in the nature of true country 
town expansion with the essential functional features of new town 
developments - as in the case of many Metropolitan schemes - this 
was fortuitous. The basic problem however was that redistribution 
did not occur on a large enough scale - hence the exposure of the
complete absence of coherent government policy in the Vest Midlands
by the Wythall Inquiry, and the hurried resumption of new town desig­
nation ^ yet so recently as 1957 the Government had firmly stated that
no further new towns were required!)
The Second Wave
"The approach does not seem to have been sufficiently 
comprehensive ... The balance sought has been largely 
between place of work and residence, between town 
and country. Not enough emphasis has been placed 
on the varying functions and sizes of cities; on the 
interrelationships of existing and new cities; and 
on an evaluation of development prospects and 
requirements from a regional and national point 
of view. Howard himself remarked near the end of 
his career that when he conceived of the idea of
1. See also Cullingworth (i960) Housing Needs and Public Policy, 
Ch. 10, Dickinson (1963) Town Planning Review, pp. 49-62.
garden cities, practically no one had "any conception 
whatever of regional planning. A colossal mistake 
might be made if in starting hew Towns the importance 
of their interrelationship has not been sufficiently 
recognised.” Exploring this wider more 'balanced vie;/ 
would appear to be one of the major tasks of the present 
generation of planners."
(Rodwin, 1956, page 7l).
Rodwin was one of the most consistently perceptive critics 
of British new towns policy, and it was the issue which he raised tS" 
that was taken up in the '60s, in a succession of regional studies.
The role of new towns was widened, taking in not only overspill, but 
regional rehabilitation. As with the first wave of London new towns, 
the towns formed part of a wider regional strategy, and again as with 
the Greater London Plan, the plans were drawn up not by established 
planning authorities, but by ad hoc regional economic planning agencies 
whose limitations were lack of direct democratic responsibility and 
the fact that so far as local authority planning was concerned, they 
had only advisory powers. Clearly, however, since central government 
planning and investment decisions at a strategic level (new towns, 
motorways, etc.) would be influenced, and the degree of interrelation­
ship now accepted meant that central decisions would deeply influence also 
the environment within which local authorities would work, it was 
important that authorities should have some influence on the planning 
process. The Lothians Regional Survey and Plan (1966) illustrates 
one aspect of this - the involvement of the relevant planning authorities 
in plan formulation, and their endorsement of the proposals. In 
theory no further formal influence is required, since only agreed 
proposals will be pursued, but in practice this represents an over­
estimate (perhaps characteristic of the '60s) of the durability of
strategic plans. Circumstances alter, and in the absence of continuing 
formal machinery to supervise plan adaptation, conflicts may emerge.
For example, the Lothians Regional Plan proposed a regional shopping 
centre at Livingston. Despite the fact that only half the expected 
population growth in the survey area has been achieved, the Develop­
ment Corporation are pursuing the shopping proposal; and local 
authorities are seriously concerned about the effects on existing 
shopping centre. (The shopping analysis was extremely poor to begin 
with, which highlights another problem of the super-confident f60s, 
over-estimation of the permanent validity of a single planning document.
The second important element in the involvement of local authoriti 
in new town planning during the ’60s was the "Partnership" concept, 
applied initially to Northampton, Peterborough and Narrington. The 
primary purpose of the arrangement was to come to terms with the fact 
that sizeable towns were being expanded in which it was neither 
desirable nor possible to replace existing authorities. But the 
scope of the arrangement was widened to include surrounding authorities 
whose resource allocation and planning environments were affected 
by the town expansions. The experience of the Peterborough partnership 
was reviewed in "the 6th Annual Report of the Development Corporation 
(H.C. 1973-74» 317)f and the kernel of the arrangement appears to 
have been the building up of a strong corporate management structure, 
on which all parties to the partnership were represented. A Develop­
ment Corporation is precisely this - a very powerful "policy and 
resources committee", but the burden of co-ordination appears in 
Peterborough to have fallen on the parallel professional teams.
Chief Officers-met jointly to review progress, while subsidiary joint 
professional teams were appointed where necessary - for example to
deal with city centre redevelopment, planning of housing areas, 
provision of social facilities, co-ordination of inputs to develop­
ment, and so on.
Perhaps the high professional quality of work and corporate 
integrationgives the misleading impression that the political com­
ponent in the partnership was minimal. There was certainly no 
political equivalent to the chief officers' review group, hut local 
authority influence could and did lead to basic objectives being 
altered where necessary.
The value of forcing apparently disparate interests into the 
same boat is simple. Whether they approve of it or not, the interests 
must operate over the same physical and economic and social space.
It is better that conflicts should be played out within the abstract 
structure of a partnership (where alternative policies can be 
generated and tested quickly and costlessly) rather than involve real 
people, real resources and really long time ppans. A formal and 
permanent "boat" in the form of a partnership agreement serves to 
concentrate the minds of all on resolution of conflict.
An example of the situation which can arise when the (sometimes
painful) process of integration is not carried through is provided
by the discrepancies in rent policies between East Kilbride and the 
1
surrounding areas • Broadly speaking, house rents are substantially 
lower in local authority areas than in the new town. As a result 
many less-skilled employees in the new town are encouraged to remain 
in their old houses, while many white collar employees working in
1. Since the operation of the new towns' rent rebate scheme the
differences are less real, but many people have not comprehended 
the changes, and the differences are still perceived to exist: 
the point remains valid.
Glasgow find that they cannot obtain suitable rented accommodation
except in the new towns. The result is a high degree of commuting 
1
within the region , which could be avoided given a higher degree 
of integration of housing rents policy. Daily movement is costly, 
and Thomas (1969, page 917) suggests that the development of East 
Kilbride and Cumbernauld may in practice have worsened road congestion 
in West Central Scotland. Lack of integration of house allocation 
policies may have the same effect.
New Towns and Regional Planning
The experience of the last fifteen years illustrates the need 
for continuous participation of local authorities in the formulation 
of new town policies, so that the machinery already in existence can 
be given the essential input absent in the 1946 and 1952 formulations - 
that is, a framework of strategic planning which comprises the two 
elements?of a central government policy on inter-regional distribution 
of population and industry, and intra-regional strategies which have 
the informed consent of the authorities affected by the proposals.
The partnership towns illustrate the value of collaboration, but 
represent only three isolated examples. How is the co-ordination 
to-be achieved more widely?
Unfortunately local government reform in England does not 
everywhere facilitate such co-ordination within the statutory planning 
system.
"The theory of - and the main justification for - local 
government reform has been that by making local govern­
ment boundaries correspond to city-regions, plan-making
1. More than twice the level found in comparable London new 
torn situations.
within each local authority can refer to a natural 
unit of economic and social interaction... Many 
of the units based on the larger free-standing cities such 
as Leicester, Nottingham or Bristol, seem to correspond 
tolerably well to the city-region concept ... But in 
some critical £reas of the country ... there will be 
no such guarantee. First by cutting the areas of 
the so-called metropolitan counties back to the limits 
of the physically-^built-up conurbations, the reform 
perpetuates the split between city and countryside in 
precisely those places where it has proved to be most 
serious in the past ... Second, by trying to preserve 
traditional county boundaries as far as possible, the 
reform continues divided responsibility for some of 
the most important growth areas of the country.
(Hall, 1973, p.452)
The present Labour government supported the original Radcliffe- 
Maud proposals, but has indicated that another bout of reform is not 
to be expected witin 10 or 15 years. Hall (ibid 45l) suggests that the 
compromise will be the continuation of ad hoc strategic planning by 
the standard planning regions:
"It will give what has been conspicuously lacking in the 
history described in this book: strong regional guidelines 
for development of the whole region, within which local 
planning authorities can set their structure plans." ts'
(ibid. page 45l) •
The participants in the planning process are likely to be 
the Regional Planning Council (representing a fairly standard range 
of local notabilities - trade unionists, planning and economics 
professors, etc.); the Regional Planning Board (representing central 
government departments concerned with the area); and local authorities.
As regards new town-type development in furtherance of a strategy, 
the question is not whether a .development corporation-type agency 
appointed via the consortium will be suitable fbr the task, but what 
other agency could possible negotiate the minefield of diverse 
interests, split planning functions and multiple contributors to 
development. A particularly explosive issue has now been added in
the form of local authorities1 claims on realised development values. 
This (itself being two-tier) accentuates the difficulties of two- 
tier planning, and provides a comprehensible issue (i.e. "who gets 
the money for which development") which the public and local authorities 
wall find easy to get very heated about.
The success of the three-cornered partnerships already in 
♦
existence suggests that there is reason for hope that more complex 
partnerships over larger areas might well prove the best possible 
agencies for new town (and any other appropriate) developments within 
the framework of regional strategic planning.
Like the Regional Planning Councils themselves, the device can 
only be a second-best alternative to fully-representative regionally- 
organised local government. The extent of collaboration between 
authorities in formulation of structure plans already apparent is 
an indication that they themselves realise the limitations of the 
framework within which they are being asked to plan, and are groping 
for a better system. The existing economic planning region framework 
offers an authoritative structure with a background of co-operation, 
and well-fitted to comprehend the more interventionist policies in 
prospect both for industry and planning.
The proposal is not a tidy, foolproof recipe for co-operation, 
but planning by its nature is not amenable to such solutions: a plan 
which was anything but tentative, pragmatic and flexible should be 
viewed with suspicion.
The final chapter takes up this general principle, and explores 
why the interrelationship between new towns and existing settlements 
is likely to become closer. It suggests in more particular terms how 
the new town machinery might be adapted for its more integrated role.
THE EMPLOYMENT CASE FOR NEW TOWNS AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATIONS
New towns set out to provide employment for their residents, 
and whether one can point to self-containment in these simple terms, 
clearly they have been very successful in attracting employment.
But has this employment simply been diverted from other locations?
New town enthusiasts have frequently claimed that new towns not only 
divert growth, but generate growth which would not otherwise have 
taken place: this makes them an important tool in regional develop­
ment. By creating conditions favourable to growth, new towns attract 
employment to problem regions which would not otherwise have come, and 
foster growth in indigenous and immigrant industry which would not 
otherwise have occurred;
"There is little doubt that the single most outstanding 
achievement of the seven (i.e. non-London Mark i) new 
towns is their contribution to industrial growth.
All three Scottish new towns - East Kilbride, Cumbernauld 
and Glenrothes - and Newton Aycliffe in County Durham, 
have brought pockets of prosperity and almost full 
employment to within otherwise depressed regions.
Without these new towns, the problems of Scotland 
and north-east England would be that much more 
intractable•"
(Thomas, 1969» p*94l)
"In the cases of Scotland and the North-East in particular, 
the new towns have been much needed magnets for new 
industrial growth."
(Self, 1974, p.85)
The purpose of this chapter is to consider whether this is the 
case, and if so, what the attributes of new towns are which make it 
so. In particular, are they attributes which local authorities would 
find difficult to duplicate? Central Scotland is the British region 
where the theory and practice of new towns as tools of regional policy
has been worked most thoroughly, and evidence in the chapter will 
largely be drawn from the area.
The growth of employment pari passu with population was essential 
for avoiding "dormitory" tendencies in new towns. This was stressed 
in the Reith reports (see Interim Report, page 14 for example), and 
the fear in 1946 was that this might prove difficult (Letchworth and 
Welwyn did not induce optimism). Suffice to say that within ten years, 
Professor Self discussed the “New Town's Industrial Boom (Self 1955)> 
suggesting that so far from being hindered by lack of employment, 
the very success was in danger of encouraging too great an expansion 
of the planned populations.
In the changed circumstances of the sixties, when regional problems 
once more became an active concern of the government, the impressive 
industrial growth of the new towns in the depressed regions suggested 
a more active role for new towns in regional policy. Prior to this 
point there had been virtually no link between new town location and 
regional policy. By I960 75$ of capital expenditure had been within 
25 miles of London and as for the non-metropolitan new towns:
"The fact that only two - Corby and Glenrothes - of the 
seven ... were located outside development areas as 
defined from 1945 to 1958, must be recognised more 
as a happy coincidence than as a positive act of 
regional planning.”
(Diamond, 1972, page 58)
New towns had already experienced the sort of conflicts which 
would arise from pursuit of other objectives - Board of Trade refusals 
to grant development certificats for towns not in development areas, 
and so on. The case for using new towns in pursuit of more widely 
defined national policies was clear enough - and it certainly had
an impressive pedigree.
Moreover new towns appeared to fit perfectly into another policy 
being strongly developed in regional policy - that of Growth Areas.
The package of ideas collected under this title was extremely persuasive. 
It represented a reaction against defensive regional policy, emphasising 
the need to invest capital in areas with potential for growth.
Investment in scattered, isolated facilities and factories was also 
mis guided, the argument ran, because only by concentration of effort 
would the "external economies" of growth and scale, so crucial to 
self-sustaining growth, be created. Professor Wilson, writing in 
19649 catches the fervour well:
"No claim to novelty can be made for the consideration ••
They are really very familiar. What is surprising is that 
it has taken so long for them to be adequately recognised 
in the formulation of policies for the less prosperous 
areas. For it will not do simply to select a number of 
scattered districts with particularly heavy unemployment 
and to offer certain inducements to industrial expansion 
... If the policy is really to succeed, particular stress 
must be laid on the existing industrial centres or on the 
scone for creating such centres. What is needed is a plan 
for regional development rather than piecemeal measures 
for small scattered districts."
(Wilson, 1964# page 13)
Because of their previous record, new towns commended themselves 
for selection as growth areas, or more accurately as the growth noints 
in growth areas: an example from the two regional development White 
Papers (on Scotland and the North-East) which were organised around 
growth area concepts:
"Outstanding examples of rapid growth in recent years have 
been the new towns and certain overspill reception centres.
Here there has been a deliberate and co-ordinated attempt 
to build up, according to a properly phased programme, 
industrial, commercial and residential communities capable 
of progressive and self-sustained expansion."
(Central Scotland, 1963* para 102)
It was felt that the success could be repeated: Professor Self claimed 
in his evidence to the Hunt Committee on the Intermediate Areas that:
"the most obvious and satisfactory growth point 
is a new town."
(Self, 1968, page 21)
Much regional policy is concerned with infrastructure investment, 
and this may explain the ease with which "growth area" policy becomes 
"growth point" policy, with the new town as the point. It can be 
claimed that a given quantity of infrastructure investment has the 
greatest impact when concentrated within one urban unit, but no analysis 
of why this should be so has been offered. Or it may be that it is 
cheapest to plan, that there are planning economies of concentration 
(the South East Study, I960, suggested that concentration on growth 
areas economised on planning capacity, a scarce resource)• Or it may 
be that since central government has most comprehensive and.direct 
influence on new towns, concentration onthem is administratively 
convenient. Whatever the case for growth points offering economies 
in infrastructure (and what evidence there is tends to suggest that 
economies of scale in service provision are very limited), this is not 
the question; rather, are there sound reasons to believe that conditions 
for economic growth are enhanced by the close physical concentration 
of activity which new towns have claimed as their particular strength?
The distinction between growth areas and growth points has been a 
real one: Glenrothes and Livingston were in the late 'sixties given 
Special Development Area status, while their officially designated 
growth area hinterlands had only Development Area status. This cannot 
be justified (so far as economic growth is concerned) unless there 
are advantages in tight economic agglomeration.
Growth point theorists have argued that there are both input- 
output and external economies of concentration. The first group
concerns the availability of components - low transport costs, 
reliable delivery, quick spreading of innovation and response to changed 
market and technical conditions. External economics arise where the 
activity of one firm reduces the costs of others: specialist services 
can be sustained: firms will benefit from the growth of a specialist 
labour pool: it may be possible to support industry-wide research 
and development facilities; local schools and universities may specialise 
in appropriate disciplines - and so on.
The test of the theory is how far new town (growth point) 
economic development has displayed such characteristics. Glenrothes, 
for instance, clearly fits the pattern, by its specialisation in elec­
tronic engineering. After the arrival of the first electronics firm 
in 1958, the Development Corporation fostered the idea of the new 
town as an "electronics centre", and today the town and surrounding 
area has a large number of firms in the industry. There are specialist 
component suppliers and a high degree of technical linkages. Local 
schools are very strong in mathematics and physics, and close links 
are maintained with the four nearby universities. There is clearly 
a specialist labour force, for firms located elsewhere advertise in 
the local press for staff.
Glenrothes, however, is very much the exception. Sound information 
on the input-output characteristics of other growth points such 
as East Kilbride and Cumbernauld is scanty, but one could be confident 
of Industrial Development Officers making the most of external economies 
of this kind, and they are never mentioned. Until demonstrated other­
wise, one may assume that they do not exist. The West Central Scotland 
Report described East Kilbride's growth as follows:
"What appears to have happened is that growth areas 
(particularly the new towns) have attempted with some 
success to attract any growing industry without losing 
their strategy too closely on the possibilities of 
building up a complex of inter-linked industries ..."
(WCS Report: The Regional Economy, page 368)
Cumbernauld is described in an appendix to an EFTA study of 
growth area theory. One would expect its economy to be discussed 
in terms of external economies of scale in this context, but instead:
"The products made in Cumbernauld are diverse; the town 
has a good representation of science-based industry, 
and products made by other manufacturers include 
carpets, clothing and packing cases."
(EFTA
which is hardly a strong case for the existence of industry-specific 
external economies!
Nor is it at all clear that the availability of specialist 
services for industry as a whole, is a significant feature of new 
towns as growth points. Casual inspection does not turn up research 
laboratories, public relations consultants, financiers, company doctors 
or the like. Would new towns be all the better for being large enough 
to support them? Luttrell (1972) who is a location consultant to 
private industry barely mentions the possibility:
"There are various functions like financial and higher 
commercial facilities that are hardly found at all in 
medium-sized towns, so that a new town will tend to 
lack these types of jobs especially in its earlier 
years•"
(Luttrell 1972, p.8l)
The early lack does not appear to be a major hinderance. A 
converse example, where presence of such a high-level service proved 
to have no local effect, is the National Engineering Laboratory at 
East Kilbride. The decision to locate in a new town was intended 
to cultivate a "technological growth point" because of the close 
physical proximity of research and development advice. In fact 
use of the facilities has not proved to be related to physical distance 
at all directly*
The argument for growth areas is that linkages, external economies, 
transmission of innovation etc. are important for growth. They have 
a spatial dimension, therefore should be spatially concentrated for
maximum effect. The weak link is the second. Much growth area theory
was grafted from the economics of underdevelopment, where "scatter"
might mean random distribution over thousands of miles of badly-serviced 
wilderness: here the case for external economies being closely related
to distance would be strong. But these are not the physical conditions
in Britain, which has a relatively dense communication network. This 
influences and is influenced by the organisation of firms. Purchases 
of inputs is not characteristically influenced by the population of 
firms within a set distance: firms such as BMC at Bathgate and Rootes 
at Linwood did not develop technical linkages with local suppliers 
as had been expected, but continued to purchase from previous suppliers 
in the Midlands. Flows of information and innovation might depend 
on the circulation of a weekly specialist newspaper, not on face-to- 
face discussion. Even transport economies of concentration may not 
be significant when firms operate standard pricing over large areas.
For reasons such as these, the West Central Scotland report 
was sceptical about the validity of small pockets of growth-area 
within the industrial belt.
"It can be argued that Central Scotland is too small and well- 
developed for the growth area policy to have much effect 
in inducing firms to grow faster because of technical or 
external economies .••
The incidence of economies of concentration would appear 
to be very slight where there is an excellent transport 
network not directly associated with the growth areas.
Industrial estates within the central belt seem to be 
just as well able to take advantage of technical economies, 
which do not appear to be a specific advantage of the 
growth areas •..
Designation of the Growth Areas in 1963 ••• implied rather 
too precise a distinction between individual locations 
within the central part of the region ..."
(WCS 1974* The Regional Economy pp 366-69)
Diamond (1972) suggests that the 1963 White Paper forestalled 
this objection, and in fact was a strategy for securing the economic 
and social advantages of a high density city along a 100 mile
urbanised zone from Ayr to Dundee.
"Economies of scale and linkage, pools of skilled labour, 
proximity to large consumer market^ choice in educational, 
technical and vocational opportunities can, it is believed, 
be more efficiently provided in this polynucleated urban 
form not fundamentally very diffemet from Ebenezer 
Howard's idea of "social cities"."
(Diamond 1972, p.63)
Why then was there further locational distinction, the granting 
of preferential development area status to the tightly-defined new 
towns? It may have been to encourage to faster take up of underused 
infrastructure - such as sewers - and so to alleviate the costliness 
of an initial bad decision to develop on self-contained new town 
lines. But Cameron (1970) in his review of growth area policy, 
corroborates that spatial discrimination in fiscal or economic policies 
on the grounds of better conditions for growth, is very diffi-^  
cult to justify. Not unnaturally, the surrounding authorities find 
discrimination which appears to have no economic justification evidence 
of undue sympathy of central government towards its new town favourites.
This analysis suggests that (provided there is spare capacity 
for residential overspill) there would be no economic disadvantage 
in expanding existing settlements within broad urbanised zones such 
as the central belt of Scotland, dispensing with new towns and their 
administrations(which local authorities see as a permanent slur on 
their abilities). This belief is partly borne out by the record of 
different areas in West Central Scotland in attracting and generating 
employment. The apparent success of the East Kilbride and Cumbernauld 
areas is due largely to the fact that they had no declining industry 
to cope with. Any employment attracted was a net growth. In gross 
terms, between 1958 and 1968 they attracted only 31$ of immigrant 
employment. Other areas took 69$ of the growth, an achievement
masked by the decline in their inherited industries.
Nor is it the case that firms once established in the new towns 
grow notably faster than those locating in the older settlements. 
Until proved otherwise, there appears in practice to be no profuse 
growth pointing to the presence of technical and external economies. 
Having said this, new towns in the central belt have grown in ways 
which suggest that they do have particular characteristics.
"... the success of East Kilbride in particular draws 
attention to the special attraction of a new town 
location and of the importance of growth itself as a 
factor producing more growth .. If it were a question 
of being attracted by low rents or cheap labour, there 
is no reason to believe that they would go to East 
Kilbride. Factory rents are the highest in Scotland.
The social composition of the town and the long journeys 
necessary for workers from Glasgow are not the sort 
of conditions to produce low wages. East Kilbride is 
a case of success breeding success ...”
(Thomas 1969» page 923)
If the explanation is not economies of linked production or of 
concentration, what is it? The experience of Glasgow perhpas gives 
a clue, for it is quite the reverse: of the 69$ of employment outside 
the new towns, it took only 8$, and this percentage has been falling 
further. The Vest Central Study concluded that this was due to the 
"very limited choice of industrial sites”. Thomas (1969) makes the 
point that by contrast:
"Perhaps the biggest single difference between the new 
town development corporation and most local authorities 
is that development corporations do seriously try to 
match the levels of employment and population." (page 815)
The early commitment to employment growth, and perhaps the 
"business” background of many development corporation members meant 
that new towns have long been skilled in wooing and servicing 
industrial growth. To the businessman it appears that new towns 
understand his problems. They have skilled staff entirely devoted
to making sure that his needs are met, and above all, the machinery 
is capable of moving very quickly. Some local authorities are equally 
good, but too many, as one industrialist described, believed that 
a brochure with views of the town was enough to influence huge capital 
decisions. The decision to provide well-sited, well serviced, industrial 
areas and buildings can be a political one: Glasgow during the ’fifties 
and ’sixties chose to devote its green-field sites to housing, and 
(presumably) accepted the risk of industrial growth being jeopardised - 
which it was. But more often one senses that the problem is simple 
incompetence: industrialists are not pursued earnestly enough; industrial 
sites are badly located and inadequately serviced; there is not enough 
flexibility in dealing with needs; and the whole process is a slow 
muddle through many committees. One can only hope that a corporate 
approach to responsibilities and administration will raise all local 
authorities to the level of competence of the new towns - there is no 
reason why it should not. It does seem particularly important: asked 
about the value of new towns in regional policy, the Department of 
Trade and Industry told the House of Commons Expenditure Committee 
on New Towns that quite simply:
’’They provide a planned environment aid are extremely 
helpful in promoting the economic development of 
central Scotland.”
(House of Commons 1973-74 18-ix question 1284)
The other great strength of the new towns is their ability to 
offer subsidised housing to all employees who want it. This is much 
more difficult for local authorities to match, for quite sound reasons.
As Thomas (1972, pp 824-25) points out, if housing were bought 
and sold like bread, readily available wherever a market developed for 
it, then the case for new towns would be very different. Housing is 
not like bread, and there is virtually no market in rented accommo­
dation outside city centres. On the one hand houses can be bought,
and on the other, local housing authorities operate local monopolies, 
allocating tenancies according to rules of their own devising. House 
policies are close to the heart of local politics, and local needs 
are strongly emphasised - eligibility is usually according first to 
"need", and secondly to length of residence, or time on waiting list.
The nature of this sytem was described by Cullingworth as follows
"The residential qualifications imposed by many councils 
have been the subject of repeated criticism, but in spite 
of this they threaten to constitute a new law of settle­
ment. Clearly there are dnagers that this may retard 
industrial mobility. There is an indication that this 
may be so: only 4$ of council tenants moved for employ­
ment reasons, compared with 15$ of all movers ... Local 
authorities appear to be in practice well organised for 
meeting local needs in a static situation."
(Cullingworth, 1965, page 6l)
New towns were also monopolists, but they allocated housing 
according to the needs of industry. They could offer a "package 
deal" to employers and employees. Employers were assured that their 
key workers would be given houses (sometimes even all the workers 
who chose to move with the firm)• The Industrial Selection Scheme 
would then ensure that any incoming workers they chose would get 
houses. In 1961 the Toothill Committee of Inquiry on the Scottish 
economy set out the effects:
"An industrialist coming to a new town ... can therefore 
count not only on the existing supply of labour, but the 
labour which will be prepared to come, given housing.
This has weighed very considerably with some of the 
enterprises which have come to Scotland within the last 
few years ... So long as the shortage of houses persists, 
whether real or exaggerated by low rents, the provision 
of houses under overspill schemes will remain one of the 
chief means of facilitating mobility."
(Toothill, 1961, page 14l)
Many local authorities would claim that development corporations 
were exploiting their undemocratic position to pursue socially 
unjustified policies: even if greater employment growth resulted, it
was bought at too high a price if housing resources were diverted
from those in "need” to those already well housed. This is a point
of view which the economist cannot criticise, although he can explore 
the consequences. Toothill takes one view:
"Some authorities - especially in the industrial belt - 
have an excellent record of helpfulness (i.e. in
providing housing for incoming workers), some have a mixed
record, many have been frankly bad. It is difficult, or 
it may be understandably be thought to be thought to be 
difficult, for a local authority to give houses to people 
newly arrived in the area when local people have been 
waiting for years for a house. It can be argued that 
special subsidies are payable for these houses, but the 
house-hungry may be unimpressed ... In consequence the 
community as a whole may suffer out of all -pro-portion 
to the demand it failed to meet.11 
(Toothill, 1961, page 133).
Local authorities should certainly feel aware of the consequences 
of their house allocation policies, but the important point for the 
question of new towns as employment generators, is that neither of 
the advantages identified in new towns need to be confined to specific 
points: they do not depend for their operation on concentration of 
economic activity in a small geographical area. For this reason, 
these advantages are quite different from the "growth point" advantages 
traditionally claimed for new towns, and can be achieved in any 
administrative unit, given the political will. The likelihood of 
local authorities sticking with their "local" and "static" attitudes, 
and the function of central agencies in this situation is considered 
in the chapter "New Towns: The Future".
It has already been suggested (Thomas, 1969, p.923) that in 
East Kilbride growth itself produced more growth. This is the concept 
of "economies of growth" as distinct from those of scale or concen­
tration. There are two ways in which this might operate - first, 
through quality of environment and second, through expansion of the
labour force.
Growth is accompanied by investment in infrastructure and services, 
and the newness of the environment may of itself encourage further 
growth. This argument has in the past been associated with new 
towns (probably because of the attractiveness to physical and design 
planners of starting with a blank sheet: "economies of scale" was 
probably a rationalisation - empirical research done shows these 
economies to be very minor).
"Newness and freshness of their environment ••• ensure 
that new towns have a strong impact on the character 
and image of a region. In particular they provide 
a striking contrast to the urban obsolescence which 
is typical of old industrial areas."
(Self, 1968, page 2l)
What is the benefit, one wonders, of this (provocative?) 
contrast to the inhabitants of depressed regions, and exactly how 
does the "impact" operate? In short, is there any reason why the 
benefits of environmental newness cannot operate in existing settlements?
Turning to the labour force advantages, the prospect of continuing 
growth in the labour from which choice can be made can be attractive 
to the industrialists. Secondly, the experience of economic prosperity 
can induce high motivation and adaptiveness in a labour force (which 
is very far from being a homogeneous quantity) • Thomas (1969) has 
suggested that East Kilbride*s wide opportunities have encouraged 
a general upgrading in the quality of the labour force through re­
training. Conservatism and defensiveness among labour in declining 
areas is such a limitation on adaptiveness of local economies that 
"growth-mindedness" and a favourable "intellectual infrastructure" 
are qualities to be valued highly.
Is there any reason to believe that such phenomena are confined 
to new towns? The West Central Scotland report suggests not. Moreover
it suggests that the concentration of overspill in new towns has 
denied the advantages of economies of growth to indigenous industry, 
much of which finds it impossible to face the direct and indirect 
costs of relocation.
"... our emphasis on the scope for an improved performance 
on the part of indigenous industry and the existing 
industrial structure suggests that particular emphasis 
in physical planning should be placed on the opportunities 
for development in the central part of the region, i.e. 
broadkly the existing conurbation, where the greater part 
of existing industry is located."
(WCS, The Regional Economy, page 312)
In other words, the benefits of an increasing population, so 
far from being maximised by concentration on a few growth points (the 
quite unsubstantiated "creative" use of overspill so much in vogue 
during the * sixties), would have a larger effect if used in existing 
settlements, so helping indigenous industry not capable of moving.
There have also been suggestions that indigenous industry is capable 
of providing more unskilled employment than mobile industries charac­
teristically bring to new towns.
This chapter deals only with the aspects of new towns which are 
said to have an influence on conditions for economic growth: there 
may be other justifications, such as aesthetic quality, the innate 
superiority of bounded towns, economies of scale in provision of services, 
but "faster economic growth" is often used as the clinching argument.
In fact, it is very difficult to find either in theory or in 
practice evidence that this is likely to be so. In the context of 
British industrialised regions, there appear to be few advantages 
to the firms in close physical concentrations of economic activities 
and services in a "growth point", (which has often been a new town).
There is no evidence that the favourable effects of growing population
or newness of infrastructure are any greater for being concentrated 
at a small number of points, rather than spead around more, according 
to other criteria. And the latest work (such as the West Central 
Study) suggests that opportunities for growth in indigenous industries 
and in the less skilled type of employment which they provide may 
be lost unless growth is allowed to take place in existing settlements.
Finally, even if it could be demonstrated that concentration can 
create more employment growth in aggregate, the process by which the 
benefits of this are transmitted to the surrounding areas has never 
been satisfactorily discussed.
"... by forming focal points of especially vigorous 
economic development, particular growth areas will 
help to create a favourable climate of growth in 
the wider catchment areas associated with them."
(Central Scotland, 1963, para 104)*
This is typically vague skating-over of the question. Growth 
point theorists seem to assume a powerful "invisible hand" at work, 
yet this area of economics is notorious for the absence of the perfect 
conditions needed for automatic, costless adjustment: daily travel 
seems to be widely assumed as the means of spreading benefits, but 
movement is costly, and people most in need are often the least mobile.
In some ways the "case" for growth points is no more than hunches 
or hopes given a spurious firmness by being named as if proved economic 
phenomena. Growth points are a tool of positive regional policy, 
allowing integrated provision of services and creative use of overspill. 
They become focal points of development from which growth diffuses 
through the local economy by means of a series of spread effects.
Word-spinning such as this is almost totally devoid of firm 
and testable meaning, yet its influence is immense. Perhaps it serves 
to reassure the planner that hejand he alone, understands and can 
control that most mysterious of forces, growth!
New towns have flourished hy their ability to meet the needs 
of industry, in the provision of well-serviced and located sites and 
premises, and in particular their ability to adapt housing policies 
to the needs of industry. Their ability derives partly from the longer 
run, prospective view (as against short-run and retrospective) which 
their centrally-appointed status allows, and partly from superior 
administration and management - essentially the "corporate approach” 
applied intelligently. There may be a case for retention of develop­
ment corporation machinery if local government fails to take note of 
the lessons, but in no way are these attributes able to be achieved 
only in concentrated geographical boundaries, such as new towns set 
up as growth points. They are not a case for growth points.
NEW TOWNS: THE FUTURE
This chapter seeks to review the experience of the new and 
expanded town machinery at work, from the point of view of its future 
use. This question is currently being discussed in Government.
During the 1973-74 session, the Home Affairs Sub-Committee of the 
House of Commons Expenditure Committee examined the new town experience, 
and in particular invited evidence advising on:
"The possibility of using new town machinery and 
procedures in other planning situations.''
(Royal Town Planning Institute, 1974, p. l)
The work was halted by the election in February 1974, and no 
report was produced. The Labour Government however continued con­
sideration, and in early 1975 produced two "Consultation Documents" 
on the new towns, one dealing with Scotland, the other with England 
and Wales. Currently (April 1975) these have circulated among 
interested groups and individuals for comment, and it remains to be 
seen what the eventual outcome is.
Such a review was stimulated by a number of factors. The 
Labour administration of 1964-70 were unhappy about the Commission 
for the New Towns, but left the issue unresolved. In 1974 the
y
Party was committed to reopening the question of the ultimate ownership 
of the new towns.
Secondly, the operation of the new Structure Planning system 
raised questions about how new town planning should be related to it.
Closely related to this was local government reform. This was 
particularly true of Scotland, where strategic planning was to be 
carried on by "regions" which encompassed both urban and rural 
interests. In Strathclyde for example was contained both the origins
and destinations of most of the planned overspill in Scotland.
One of the justifications for the new town machinery was that 
only it could transcend the tightly-drawn boundaries and different 
interests of congested urban authorities and their neighbours. Could 
new town planning now be left safely to regional authorities?
Reorganisation along comparable town-and-country lines was 
frustrated by the Conservative government in 1971, but even here there 
appeared to be co-operation in drawing up of structure plans - in the 
West Midlands for example. Could new towns in practice be handled 
adequately by local government?
Fourthly, the Government saw its proposals for public ownership 
of development land as giving local authorities the means of "a positive 
approach to planning, land assembly and development" which new towns 
had "successfully pioneered in the public interest" (New Towns in 
England and Wales, 1974 para l.l). Had new towns any lessons for 
local authorities in the exercise of these powers?
The nature of new towns in themselves has changed since 1946.
A previous chapter showed how new towns were a means of combining two 
attributes - environmental quality and access to opportunity - in a 
better way than congested urban centres or large dormitory estates had 
been able; but that the inclination of those behind the 1946 Act was 
to do this in a highly specific physical way. This reflected the power­
ful traditional ideal town - small, physically separated from others, 
functionally self-sufficient, socially balanced and intensively 
planned. The virtues of this ideal were essentially spiritual - a
sense of civic identity, development of highly integrated personalities 
1
and so on . The need for new, distinct settlements was much of the
1. For the highest development of this concept, see Osborn 1946 
"Green Belt Cities".
case for new, distinct administrative units.
The changes in the physical appearance of new towns are important 
because they reflect the declining force of the "metaphysical” objectives 
in new town development. The twin aims of environment and opportunity 
have remained important, but they are now resolved in a much less 
restricted physical form. Self-containment as such is not now valued; 
"sprawl" as such is not now condemned in professional planning thought 
(as the political objections to new town conceits suggests, ordinary 
people probably always had this down-to-earth outlook).
The change can be seen in different ways. Extensions to existing 
towns were recommended to Reith, who dismissed the idea without even 
considering whether a well-planned addition could give immediate 
advantages of wide choice of employment and services to immigrants.
The notion was inconsistent with the ideal civic entity, not an 
"essay in civilisation" at all.
In due course, the great inconveniences of starting from green­
field sites became one of the more unpopular features of new towns, 
and when the second group of London overspill towns were designated 
in the 'sixties, the choice was made to take some large towns and 
enlarge them considerably. The case for this was made in terms of 
access to opportunity and ease of extension, both of population and 
industry: the notions of easy access to open countryside, civic 
consciousness, integrated community life, are quite abandoned.
Part of the separateness of the early new town was self-containment 
in employment. Reith accepted that people might travel to larger 
centres to see a good film, but not (apparently) to get a good job. 
Allocation of houses proceeded on the basis that no one should travel 
elsewhere to work. The practical outcome was quite different, but
even in principle the Government now takes a different view:
"... it no longer seems sensible to insist that a 
breadwinner should actually work within the 
designated area before one houses the family.
With increased mobility it must be accepted that 
a development corporation cna house a family whose 
head has, or finds, a job within a reasonable 
commuting distance."
(New Towns in England and Wales 1974 para l.l)
It remains true that the welfare of the community as a whole 
is increased if an effort is made to offer as wide a range of employ­
ment as possible, as close as possible to the most people. Other 
things being equal, people prefer to live nearer rather than farther 
from their work. But it is not necessarily bad that some prefer to 
travel for a wider choice. The constant increasing of target size 
of new towns was partly an attempt to widen employment range. But why 
should increasing distances travelled witl^/a designated area be any 
more acceptable than travel between existing settlements in a "town 
cluster"? The less restrictive interpretation of self-sufficiency 
weakens the case for distinct new towns surrounded by green belts.
It is an argument for intelligently-combined housing, employment 
and services, which can be achieved in groups of existing settlements. 
These may appear physically to be too extensive to be efficient (in 
the sense of combining environmental quality and access to opportunity) 
but in fact operate much as the elements of Howard's Social City would, 
(se? Hall, 1973, page 38l).
The third element in the 1946 case against extensions was "social 
imbalance". New towns, it was claimed, could combine all classes, 
to the benefit of social health, simply by providing housing for all 
classes (Hansard, Vol. 422, 8th May 1946, p. 1088). In fact, as a 
whole, new towns have achieved a poor balance within the working class
the most significant range. They have not fostered upward social 
mobility for lower-income working classes. Within new towns socially- 
segregated districts quickly emerged. And sociologists have criticised 
the theoretical basis of new town social policy. Do people actually 
feel the better of close social mixing: what is the objective: does 
it foster social opportunity: does greater physical separation hinder 
it? As regards "neighbourhood units”, the typical new town device - 
does the physical expression really reflect how people structure 
their social relations? All in all, sufficient doubt has been cast 
on the reality of what separately-administered urban unity could 
achieve. The case against intelligent peripheral development by local 
authorities to this extent is weakened.
There have also been important changes in the conditions within 
which development operates. A high rate of population growth will tend 
to strengthen the case for large new settlements to relieve the 
pressures (whatever they may be) on existing areas, and so the soaring 
population estimates of the early '60s do much to explain the return 
to new town designation after the barren ’fifties. These estimates 
have been continuously pared, and the latest figures suggest that 
population in 2000 may be no more than to-day's. The sharp change 
in this basic parameter must influence the scope for large new 
settlements•
Economic growth is also a subject for pessimism. There is no 
growth in prospect, and it remains to be seen if indigenous oil 
restores a possibility of the 4% p.a. growth planned for during the 
'60s. Some observers take a more pessimistic view, that oil cartels 
may be followed by third world metal ore, phosphates cartels and so on.
In the short run, transfer of population and economic activity is eased
if there is enough growth for no absolute decline to be anywhere
required, simply differential growth. Self (Expenditure Committee 
1973-74 q*564) described a new town as "an engine for town building 
within the context of expansion". Can new towns survive without the 
lubricant of all-round prosperity?
Related to overall prosperity is its distribution through society, 
and there is now greater scepticism about the disadvantages in society 
benefitting automatically from overall growth. It is now accepted 
that some of the most needy cannot be helped except in situ, that many 
of the worst off do not have the mobility or initiative to benefit ^
from jobs provided in a new town intended to operate as a regional
growth centre. In other words, new towns as presently constructed, 
not only have not helped the most disadvantaged, but in many ways 
cannot.
David Eversley (1974) described these changed circumstances, and 
concluded that everything pointed to a shift in emphasis towards 
development of existing settlements:
"The Northern Region strategy team ... would be wise 
if it based its report on further shifts towards 
a aystem of selective infrastructure and income 
improvements in existing settlement areas. The time 
for grandiose plans and new cities is over." (page 455)
"The real question for the regional planner, and for 
his national counterpart, is this: how can a reduced 
volume of total fresh investment produce the greater 
benefits for those sections of the population in 
greater need ... wherever such people may be living 
now?" (page 455)
The recommendations in the Strategic Plan for the North Nest 
are consistent with Eversley*s approach. They explicitly take 
distribution of benefits into account and conclude that the most 
useful strategy is to improve the settlements and social equipment
the Mersey belt, including Liverpool. Central Lancashire New Town 
is not thought to be necessary until the 1950s/60s population boom 
works through to family-formation age.
New Towns and Local Authorities
How far the emphasis on existing settlements should be taken is 
a matter for debate, aid Eversley perhaps stands at the far end of the 
spectrum. The New Towns Association told the Expenditure Committee 
(HC 1973-74 18-v) that there remained a need for significant relocation 
of population from London and other congested urban areas: they felt 
that "there will be a continuing need for machinery which will permit 
effective and purposeful intervention". The London Boroughs Association 
severely criticised the social selection which new towns had practised, 
but stressed that the development corporation mechanism offered most 
scope for improving the lot of overcrowded Londoners:
"This is where the new towns are in a unique situation.
There may be three conflicting interests in the 
designation of a New Town. Whose views are to be 
respected? First there may be those residents whose 
amenities will be adversely affected ••• Secondly 
there may be other local residents whose amenities 
and prospects may improve ••. Thirdly, and totally 
ignored in any purely local democratic exercise, 
would be the people in housing need in Inner London 
for whom the New Town would be designed. No locally- 
elected authority could be expected to respect their 
interests! Basically then the democratic issues are 
not the same in the New Town situation as they are in 
other planning situations. For this reason the 
Development Corporation is uniquely suited to New 
Town Development."
(HC 18 - X, page 352-3)
This appears to be the approach which the Government has accepted, 
that where large-scale redistribution of population is required, centrally- 
appointed corporations will remain the appropriate agencies.
"Although the legislative framework for designating and 
developing new towns remains sound in most of its 
essentials, some policy changes are needed if the machinery 
is to function as well for the future as it has done for 
the past."
(New towns in England and Wales, 1974, para 3*2)
"The new local authorities will he planning for the 
generality of development required in England and 
Wales, through the machineiy of structure plans and 
local plans• But there may well he further special 
cases where the need for development does not arise 
locally and where the national interest will he best 
served by setting up under the New Towns Act a single- 
minded development corporation path to plan and promote 
the development. This is a possibility which the 
Government would wish to leave open ..."
(ibid. para 3*7)
One major policy change however is to encourage better relations 
between local authorities and development corporations. By definition 
distinct authorities indicate different interests, but the Government 
can encourage co-operation by laying down the ground rules through which 
resolution of conflict may be achieved. Richard Crossman as Minister 
attempted this in the partnership agreements relating to Peterborough, 
Northampton and Warrington, and it is felt that the principle should 
be applied to other new towns. It was perhaps one of the weaknesses 
of the 1946 Act that there was no formal provision made for consul­
tative machinery. Even without statutory power, regular consultation 
might well have deepened understanding on both sides of the purposes 
and problems of development, instead of the bitter hostility which often 
marred early relationships (and which often derived from different 
temperamental approaches to policy and administration, rather than 
substantive issues). Reith had requested such a provision, and his 
advice was neglected.
But if local authorities are willing to co-operate in schemes 
like these, why is a development corporation needed at all? An important 
fact is that development corporations may not be so important for
conferring favourable financial advantages but in providing an effective 
co-ordinating agency. Large scale development requires the bringing 
together of a great many agencies, and the working out of financial 
terms which lead to provision of services. Local authorities may be 
well-disposed to accepting (say) Londoners, but have no incentive 
to surmount the problems of doing so. The development corporation 
can take the basic good-will, and built on it a single-minded organisation 
wholly devoted to surmounting obstacles, not avoiding them (which is 
a perfectly rational local authority outlook)•
Development requires a commitment to stability of policy which 
is not always provided in local government. The Town and Country 
Planning Association described how Swindon's will to expand was 
shared by Labour and Conservative councillors, and could survive 
changes of administration. Ashford, on the other hand, voted six 
times for expansion, seven times against (HC 1973-74 18 iii cf 568).
The development corporation is a device for taking a decision, once 
freely made, out of the political arena slightly for long enough 
to enable development to take place.
Thirdly, local authorities entirely on their own might not make 
an objective assessment of the benefits and costs of expansion for 
overspill. In Peterborough there is a great deal of hostility towards 
Londoners, who supposedly cheat Peterburghers out of houses. This 
prejudice is probably unfounded - but ill-informed hostility is as 
important to councillors as well-founded objections. The joint agency 
is a means of reaching an objective view of the effects of expansion, 
and giving councillors a certain amount of elbow room to devise policies 
in the long-run interests of the city concerned. Gross abuse of the 
privilege will still be rewarded with loss of office^and there is 
great scope for influencing development policy since development
corporation members will be equally willing to listen to reasoned 
points of view. The proof of this system is that it appears to function 
effectively1 there is certainly a world of difference between the 
situation after 1946 and that in partnership towns.
Johnson (1973) conducted a comparison of the development of two 
overspill towns for Glasgow. Cumbernauld was an official new town with 
a development corporation. Linwood was a private arrangement between 
Glasgow Corporation, the Scottish Special Housing Association and the 
District Council. The study concluded that the quality of integration 
of development at Linwood was substantially inferior. There was 
fragmented responsibility for house provision, social provision, statutory 
planning, and no attempt was made to set up an ad hoc committee 
concerned to achieve co-ordination. Housing had been provided for the 
Rootes car plant, and no effort was made to achieve a healthier balance 
of employment. Those not working in Rootes had to travel to Paisley, 
Johnstone or Glasgow, and female workers were particularly badly off.
Thus:
"It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the creation 
of a Development Corporation would have resulted in a 
more satisfactory development at Linwood."
(Johnson, 1973, page 90)
Johnson suggested that a development group or liaison committee 
of officials from the agencies involved would also have resulted in 
more satisfactory development without any change in the statutory 
financial arrangements, simply because it would have been continuously 
and solely concerned with the welfare of the emergent unit. The 
advantage of a development corporation is more than financial: there 
is a significant organisational element also.
The partnership at Peterborough was three cornered - Development 
Corporation, City Council and County Council, for the Government 
recognised that the demands a new town made on local authorities 
other than authorities whose cities were being expanded, were sub­
stantial. Conversely, even a new town not specifically planned to 
perform a regional function would influence the function of an entire 
area. In both England and Wales and Scotland however, it is emphasised 
that where new towns perform different functions from local authorities, 
ultimate responsibility must remain with the centrally-appointed agency. 
But in each case, local authorities1 influence on the resource allocation
decisions which new towns inevitably involve is strengthened. In
England and Wales, the Minister warns:
“.. if both structure planning and new town master planning 
are to be successful, a high degree of harmonious 
co-operation between the authorities is essential."
(New Towns in England and Wales, 1974* para 3*ll)
While in Scotland the Secretary of State feels that local 
participation in decision-making is desirable,
"He will encourage co-operative arrangements between I
development corporations and new local authorities in 
the provision of services and social facilities in the
New Towns and in the exercise of their inter-related 1
functions."
(The Scottish New Towns, 1975 para 8)
Part of this encouragement will be the continuing appointment 
of Ha substantial proportion of members from local government” to 
corporations. Reith specifically ruled out appointment of local 
government members as representatives, and this position is here 
being sustained in theory. But the commitment by the Secretary 
strengthens the role of councillors who de facto if not de .jure must 
tend to act as representatives would.
“Greater participation" by local authorities is probably a
fair description of the change, for the emphasis, as in planning 
participation in general, is on devising forms within which different 
points of view can be developed and reviewed, without alteration of 
the final constitutional responsibilities.
The evidence of the partnership towns suggests that the arrange­
ment will encourage better integration of new town development and wider 
planning. There may be more apparent conflict, but if this means that 
differences are being settled rationally, rather than settled on the t/' 
basis of political weight, then that is no undesirable thing. The 
proposal differs sharply from that proposed by the Scottish new towns 
to the Wheatley Commission^ that in cases of disagreement with local 
authorities, development corporations should be able to provide the 
service and indent for cost - which would have further insulated new 
towns from local authority thinking on resource allocation.
One of the mo3t persuasive objections to the working out in 
practice of new town administration is that it, in the words of the 
English and Welsh Document:
" •• allows the new towns to beggar the cities they serve 
by taking only the relatively fortunate members of society 
and leaving the least fortunate behind..." ^
(para 3*16)
Most of the evidence presented to the Expenditure Committee was 
to the effect that the new towns were not helping the unskilled and 
those in greatest need, to the extent that could be expected of a 
public body with the capacity to impose unpopular tenant selection 
policies. The early selection procedure was intended to make sure 
that those who lived in new towns worked there to avoid the emergence 
of dormitory suburbs. As it operated, however, when a firm was
1. Wheatley Commission, Written Evidence Vol. 8, pp. 27-39
choosing the labour it did not bring as key labour or recruit in the 
vicinity, it was presented with perhaps twenty applicants, chosen 
primarily for their aptitude, not housing need. Prom this the firm 
chose the person to get the job and be rehoused - again on the basis 
of ability and not housing need. This process tended to single out the 
most economically tractable people, and the marginal advantage to the 
firm might well have been outweighed by the social consequences of 
the selective loss to the exporting area. This should be changed, 
said the London Boroughs Association, so that choice is primarily 
by housing need, although movers should have a reasonable prospect 
of finding work.
Secondly, those industries moving to the new towns tended not 
to employ the type of people in housing stress. The Association 
claimed that new towns were economically strong enough to select firms 
according to whether they employed the people the towns set out to house 
a neat reversal of the matching process.
Peter Self of the Town and Country Planning Association admitted 
(HC 1973-74 18-vi, q.948) that there was scope for such changes:
"I think it is probable that you have to go through a 
first stage which is jobs, jobs, jobs, because the 
whole thing will not take off otherwise. Then maybe 
after twenty years you can begin to modify this and 
get more flexible and sensitive to particular social 
requirements•"
However, the demands of the London Boroughs Association went 
further than requiring new towns to take their "fair share" of 
economically less productive people - such as pensioners, the unskilled, 
the disadvantaged. As public agencies, new towns should redress the 
imbalance caused by "unplanned" overspill. But since unplanned 
movements outnumbered planned by 9:1 between 1961 and 1971, to make
a significant impact, movement to new and expanded towns would have 
to be quite extraordinarily imbalanced: is there any reason to transfer 
social imbalance from London boroughs to new towns?
In fact the Government is not specific in its intentions to 
improve the social performance of the new towns. The changes will 
probably take the form of requiring a greater emphasis on housing 
need in industrial selection, a higher proportion of less-skilled 
employment, better publicity among less well-informed groups about 
the opportunities of moving, and possibly specific requirements in 
absorbing groups such as pensioners, the unemployed, minority groups 
and so on. In all a significant improvement which new towns are 
in a strong position to bear, but no substitute for remedial action 
in restoring the physical, social and economic fabric of the inner- 
city areas.
Ownership of New Town Assets
The question of ownership of new town assets was not examined 
by the Expenditure Committee, but it was an issue of importance 
to the Labour government. In the party's "Programme for Britain" 
the transfer of housing and local assets (such as district shopping 
centres) to local authorities in the commission new towns, and the 
district-by-district transfer in developing new towns, was seen as 
essential to the fundamental principle of local democracy. Whether 
the importance is symbolic only is difficult to gauge. In 1967, 
Cullingworth's researchers showed no high passion among new town 
residents about the great constitutional issues some claimed to be 
at stake. As regards the claim that development corporations are 
"undemocratic", new towns can justly point out that local authorities' 
record in the field of responsiveness to public feeling (even without 
the question of "which public") has hardly been outstanding, as the
need for the Government to impose standards of participation on what 
claim to be highly responsive bodies emphasises. Not a strong position 
from which to criticise: new towns claim that in practice they have 
been more democratic -
"... development corporations have always been conscious 
of the need to win and hold local support if they are 
to function effectively. All of them have taken great 
trouble over public information and. are in the forefront 
of public authorities in enlisting public participation 
in their proposals."
(HO 1973-74 18-v, page 204)
Cullingworth defined the desirable tenure pattern not in terms 
of who traditionally "ought" to control public housing, but in terms 
of performance of a given objective, which he suggested to be the 
pattern which:
".. provides the widest range of choice to the consumer, 
meets the needs of all groups in the community, involves 
the least change on public funds which is consistent 
with giving assistance to those who cannot afford 
housing of the standard determined politically as 
being acceptable, and presents the fewest barriers 
to mobility."
(Cullingworth, 1967, page 153).
It is a matter of debate, in particular circumstances, whether 
local authorities or development corporations meet these requirements 
better, and indeed whether the requirements are acceptable. But a 
process of open analysis of objectives and effectiveness is involved, 
unlike the handing over of housing to local authorities out of com­
mitment to a political "principle".
To take a specific example, Cullingworth discovered that the 
opportunity to own one's home was a major concern to many people: 
whether they were more likely to achieve this was the main influence 
on attitudes to local authorities or development corporation ownership. 
It is by no means clear that local authorities can better achieve 
a policy on this which will stand public debate than can development
corporations.
The major issue around which debate on local or corporation control 
centres is not home ownership, but the ability of each body to cope 
with movement of people for employment reasons. Government thinking 
emerges more clearly from the Scottish Consultation Document because 
in Scotland the complication of movement for overspill reasons is felt 
to be absent:
”... the role of the new towns as providers of sites 
for overspill homes ... is now less important than it 
was and their attention can be focussed primarily 
on their role of promoting economic growth."
(The Scottish New Towns, 1975, para 6)
The tendency for local housing authorities to take a narrowly 
local view of housing policies is well-known and much regretted.
The ability of development corporation to pursue allocation policies 
directly related to industrial movement is equally argued:
".. by its (the development corporations) very nature 
it is likely to take a more objective view on letting 
policy than one could get from a local authority, 
particularly where the new town is serving a semi- 
regional function and houses should be let to persons 
other than those living in the town. It will there­
fore assist .. in facilitating mobility of labour.”
(Cullingworth, 1967, page 38)
This view was put to Cullingworth by a local authority official 
which perhaps indicates that local authorities often welcome external 
agencies, because they realise the importance of servicing industrial 
growth, but are unable to act because of adverse political constraints. 
This was the view which the Scottish Special Housing Association 
(a body with similar housing policies to new towns) put to the 
Wheatley Commission:
"Where a local authority is providing houses partly 
paid for from local rates, it is only natural that 
poorly-housed ratepayers expect to be rehoused.
This can at times be an embarrassment to a local 
authority who would otherwise be prepared to 
provide houses for incoming industrial workers 
required to encourage the economic expansion 
of the area. The Association suffers from 
no such embarrassment and as national and not 
local funds are involved in the Association's 
operations, there is not the same difficulty 
in providing houses not primarily intended for 
local inhabitants."
(Wheatley, Minutes of Evidence, Vol 8, page 12)
The "balance" case for development corporation ownership was 
also put to Cullingworth by the New Towns Association.
"Development corporations must provide a wide range 
of different types of housing to attract people of 
all incomes and capabilities. This is again an 
attraction for industry and also improves the overall 
quality of life in the town. Local authorities may 
be compelled for political and other reasons to 
restrict the provision of houses to those suitable 
only for the lowest income levels."
(Cullingworth, 1967, page 48).
In general terms, the Government appears to accept the labour 
mobility/employment growth case for new towns:
".. the availability of housing to let has been of 
the highest importance to them in their efforts to 
attract industry."
(New TovnBin Scotland 1975, para 14)*
"Until the development of the New Town has been 
completed, great weight must be given to the 
overriding need to promote growth in the Scottish 
interest, which experience shows can be pursued 
to good advantage by a development corporation 
in full control of the assets it has created ...
Eor this reason the Government do not see 
advantage in providing for the transfer of 
property to local authorities during the period 
of development of the New Town save where this 
is agreed by the corporation and the local authori­
ties to be in their mutual interest."
(ibid. para 10).
Government policy is that during development, corporations will 
retain their present control over all assets. When development is 
completed, housing and associated local commercial assets will be 
assumed by local authorities, while commercial and industrial assets
will be managed in the national interest. The assumption is that new 
towns will have performed their distinctive role in servicing economic 
growth, and are no longer required, since it is also Government policy 
in Scotland (although the way is left open in England for overspill 
towns^) that no further centrally-sponsored towns will be created.
The Consultation Document in fact reveals a rather ambivalent attitude 
towards new towns: their non-local administration is valuable in 
providing support for economic growth, yet this administration is 
to be phased out as quickly as the present towns reach maturity.
For example, new towns are asked to co-operate in housing "people 
in priority categories determined by the local authority, such as 
teachers and nurses". If these groups are so vital to the community, 
why cannot they be housed in the normal way? It is politically 
unacceptable to give them houses, or are they dissatisfied with local 
authority housing? In either case, new town authorities are being 
expected to "paper over the cracks" in local authority administration: 
and what will happen when such independent housing authorities cease 
to exist? Similarly, new towns are asked to "assist local authorities 
in their endeavours to promote employment outside the boundaries 
of the designated areas". Again, what is the fundamental defect 
preventing the "normal" (as the Government affirms) housing authorities 
from doing this job? The Consultative Document fails to tackle the 
questions which the very need for an extra-local agency raises, and 
proposes the abandonment of the agencies (which it claims to value 
highly) without resolving the basic defects.
Cullingworth pursued these thoughts in 1967:
1. See "New Towns in England and Waled* 1974» para 3*7.
"A transfer of housing to local authorities would 
set the seal of 'normality' on the town. So far 
as we have been able to judge, there are no 
disadvantages in this which are not shared bv other 
towns which already have a large proportion of 
publicly owned property."
(Cullingworth 1967, page I6l)
He suggested that these disadvantages were serious enough to 
raise the possibility of housing being taken out of local hands 
entirely:
"One conclusion which could be drawn from, for example, 
an analysis of the inadequacies of local authority 
rent and tenant-selection policies is that housing 
should be removed entirely from local government.
Ad hoc bodies such as development corporations ... 
do precisely this ... By definition local a uthorities 
are locally responsible bodies. Their 'localities' 
may be too constricted, but that is another matter 
which as receiving attention elsewhere."
(ibid, page I6l).
The attention Cullingworth spoke of was review of local 
government as a whole. Wheatley showed his view of the limitations 
of very local control of housing:
"Housing policy raises issues clearly related with 
strategic planning, and should preferably be worked 
out over the same wide areas."
(Wheatley Commission, 1969, Report, para 470)
Accordingly he placed housing alongside structure planning 
at regional level. His advice was ignored, and housing in Scotland 
remains a district function, which gives no reason to suppose that 
the broader perspective of the new towns will be met within con­
ventional local politics. It may be that the Government will never
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accept that the existing new towns' development phases will have 
ended; or that they intend to use the Scottish Special Housing 
Association; or that they expect regionally-sponsored development 
agencies to supervise the provision of housing in support of economic 
growth (which is a process of continuing adaptation, a fact the
Government do not appear to have understood)•
Prom the Consultation Documents, however, it appears that the 
traditional function of a new town in supporting labour mobility and 
economic growth is to be abandoned. In Scotland, then, where the 
overspill function of new towns is also discounted, it appears that 
the Document marks the end of the centrally-snonsored corporation 
as a tool of planning, although there may prove to be a bright future 
for locally-sponsored corporations and partnerships involving local 
and central finance and membership. In England, where overspill is 
still required (although the extent is a matter of debate) it appears 
as though the continuance of the Development Corporation will be more 
positive, although the "partnership" concept will be developed, to 
meet the difficulties of greater physical interaction of old and new 
developments, and the general recognition that new towns should function 
as an inter-related part of existing settlement clusters.
The continuation of central control of commercial and industrial 
assets of regional and national importance is less significant. In 
England, the Commission for the New Towns is to perform this function, 
but it may offer its expertise outwith the new towns, as an agency 
service. The intention is that the agency will perform a national 
factoring function, akin to the work of the Scottish Industrial Estates 
Corporation. Indeed there are suggestions in the Documents that 
outwith England, the work will be absorbed into the duties of the 
Scottish and (projected) Welsh Development Agencies.
Future Use of the New Town Machinery
When the Expenditure Committee pointed out to the Town and 
Country Planning Association witnesses that strategic plans did not 
seem to refer specifically to "new towns", Professor Self replied
that the Strategic Plan for the South-East;
".. does not use the words "new town”. It used the 
words "growth area” or "medium growth area". Y/hat 
is a growth area? I mean, it is an. area which looks 
rather like a new town, but is spread around more over ^  
a larger scale ..."
(H.C. 1973-74, 18-iii, q 540)
This development was a logical outcome of viewing new towns 
as centres of growth areas. If development corporations had been 
largely successful in directing development within a tightly defined 
designated area, was it time to extend development corporation-type 
powers over wider areas, now that new towns were viewed as an integral 
part of a regional structure?
Hall (1973, page 455) pointed out that the discrete growth 
zones proposed constituted developments as substantial as new towns, 
but over a much larger area:
’’Yet no specific machinery is posed for acquiring the 
land and carrying through the expensive and difficult 
provision of nfrastructure."
The question posed was this: should local authorities be given 
development-corporation-type powers of land acquisition and assembly; 
or should the centrally-appointed corporation be given jurisdiction 
over the wider area now admitted to constitute its zone
of influence?
The Wheatley Commission in 1969 recognised that there might be
situations where strategic redistribution of population might be 
needed, while the policy had no implications outside the local authority 
areas:
"It is an essential part of the job of a strategic 
planning authority to decide to what extent the 
population needs to be redistributed within its 
own bounds, in pursuance of social, economic and 
land-use objectives. New town development as we 
see it is simply one means of giving effect to the 
authority’s strategic planning decisions."
(Wheatley Commission Report, para 292).
Accordingly, new town planning and finance of this nature should 
be a local government concern, probably handled by a special agency 
within the system. The legislation to enable this was not incorporated 
in the reform, but the Scottish Consultative Document indicates the 
Government's sympathy towards the proposal.
"A possible development, as strategies are worked out 
by the regional councils, may however be the identifi­
cation of regional needs for urban redevelopment using 
the special facilities and powers for the assembly and 
development of land available to development corporations •• 
Action in this regard will be upon the initiative of the 
new regional authorities, in the light of their assess­
ment of their needs and of alternative methods of 
meeting them."
(The Scottish New Towns, 1975» para 12).
The prospective arrangements are considerably complicated by the 
fact that housing is not (as Wheatley recommended) under the same 
authority as structure planning, but this is a problem which will 
arise whether local new towns are planned or not.
The possibility of such an adaptation of the development corpo­
ration machinery was raised in evidence to the Expenditure Committee, 
for example by the Town and Country Planning Association, who suggested
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"Roving Regional Development Corporations, with strong, if not complete, 
local authority membership. The Royal Town Planning Institute suggested 
"Special Development Boards", sponsored by one or more local authority, 
with powers to borrow money and purchase land on the same terms as 
development corporations. It may seem surprising that the English 
Consultation Document makes no mention of the possibility of locally- 
sponsored corporations.
The explanation is perhaps that the Government felt that its 
land proposals, enabling and requiring local authorities to acquire 
at existing use value all land required for development over the ^
next ten years, gave local authorities the substance of the new town 
advantages.
"This is not to deny that plan-making is a very 
valuable function of our local authorities, 
it is rather to point out that the existing 
powers to implement their plans are restricted 
by the price that the market puts on some land, 
and by the fact that the planners' resource is in 
the hands of private owners rather than at the 
disposal of the community."
("Land", 1974, para 19).
The plan was described by Wilcox (1975) as
allowing planners the freedom of choice usually 
available only when conceiving new towns."
(Wilcox, 1975, page 154)
The intention of the proposals is clearly this, to give local 
authorities the advantageous powers of land assembly at existing use 
value which the new towns had used so effectively, or as the thought- 
avoiding expression has it "encouraging positive planning". Powers 
are one thing, however, and a great many professional observers 
(and, one understands, Whitehall officials) note, ability to use 
them is quite another. If successful development is defined in 
terms of the highest possible combination of environmental quality 
and access to opportunity, then when local authorities' powers have 
most approached those anticipated in the White Paper, the results ^  
have sometimes been very bad indeed - vide Easterhouse in Glasgow, 
and more recently, Wester Hailes in Edinburgh.
Wilcox (l975) develops this theme at some length, suggesting 
that there are two problems. First plain ineptitude, and secondly, 
intemperate political interference in the composition of development. ^  
"Ineptitude" is perhaps rather harsh: it may be that the complete 
initiation (rather than fairly crude control) of development, is 
a task not appropriate for local authorities as presently constituted. 
Thus:
"Perhaps I am soured by reporting the London planning 
scene for six years, but I have the most profound
doubts about the ability of councils to initiate 
developments rather than control it.
... nowhere in the country can there be more 
planners to the acre than in County Hall, The 
elected members just don't know which way to turn 
... By what mechanism would the GLC, say, assess 
the total quantities and distribution of office 
space, warehousing, industry, shops? From past 
experience we know the answer. Whatever sophisti­
cated research methods might be deployed .•• the 
ultimate decision would rest on whether members 
of the Labour group had got over their antipathy 
to Harry Hyams ... Labour members happily admit 
that their policy is dictated by dislike of office 
building in itself."
(pp. 196-7).
As the example of Linwood cited above suggests, even with new 
town-type powers, there may be a strong case for the continuation of 
the use of the development agency machinery^ in a modified fonn, the 
local authority-sponsored agencies foreshadowed in the Scottish 
Consultative Document. The advantages of centrally-appointed develop­
ment corporations were outlined to the Expenditure Committee by the 
Royal Town Planning Institute as follows:
1 • They can straddle administrative boundaries (and it should
be remembered that the land assembly proposals raise "all
the horrors of two-tier planning authorities", while the
difficulties of multiple agencies of development remain)•
2. They are organised to apply themselves single mindedly to
2
the task in hand.
1• "Take the example of Telford, which is I think a very
good example of a new town where work is going ahead f  
which I cannot conceive would have been done by the 
existing local authorities ... The sheer complexity 
of the co-ordination would not allow it."
(Prof. Self, H.C. 18-iii 1973-74 q. 565)
2. "The Government recognise that much of the success of
the Scottish New Towns is to be ascribed to their ability 
to focus staff effort, bringing together a variety of 
professional disciplines into closely-knit planning, 
administrative, development and promotional teams."
(The Scottish New Towns, 1975, para ll).
3« They have a more corporate approach to development, and
a tradition of inter-departmental co-operation "often sadly 
lacking in local authorities."
4* They can pursue development, once its basic purpose and form
has been (politically) determined, free from immediate political 
influence and on a stable footing.
(H.C. 1973-74 18-vii, page 27l)
The disadvantages mentioned - overall political unaccountability, 
lack of integration with other authorities' plans, and lack of powers 
as wide as local authorities, would appear to be overcome in locally- 
sponsored agencies, which might well offer the best of both worlds.
The land proposals are significant, because they not only open 
the way for the creation of locally appointed development agencies, 
giving them the substance of the advantages enjoyed by the old central 
agencies. But by placing the responsibility for positive and more 
interventionist planning on local authorities, the Government is 
challenging them to produce planning and development of as high a 
quality as the new towns have achieved (albeit for too narrowly-defined 
purposes) in their enclaves. This is a development of the utmost 
importance. It is an opportunity to bridge the gulf between new town 
planning and "the rest", which has grown up since 1947, and it is 
ironical that it represents an opportunity to achieve the integration 
outlined in 1934 by the Harley Committee:
"We deem it essential at the outset of our report to 
state that our investigations have led us to view 
'Garden Cities' and other developments of a similar 
kind rather as elements intiie wider sphere of regional 
and national planning than as constituting a problem 
apart ... It is therefore mainly in relation to the 
proper and orderly correlation of industrial, resi­
dential and other developments ... that we propose 
to consider the problem involved in our terms of 
reference taken as a whole."
(Harley Report, 1934, para 4).
The gradual trend in new town planning towards integration with
wider intra-regional organisation represents movement towards this 
1
understanding • The Government has stated that where developments of 
non-local origin are involved, it will continue to appoint central 
agencies* But the opportunities to apply the lessons emerging from 
the successful organisation of development corporations and their 
achievement of a high level of planning (in the sense that environ- 
mental quality and access to opportunities are combined efficiently ), 
lie with local authorities* If agencies with the attributes and skills 
of development corporations are successfully integrated into the struc­
ture of local (i.e. non-central) planning, then the result could be 
the most important contribution of the new town experience to future 
planning - certainly more significant than the limited use made - 
and apparently to be made - of centrally-appointed agencies.
1• "The idea of a New Town as a self-contained and separate 
entity is giving way to the newer and socially more 
healthy concept of a New Town as the centre of a wider 
district. The needs are again complimentary: as well 
as the use of the town's facilities by residents of a 
wider area, the residents of Bracknell appreciate and 
enjoy the advantages and attractions of the surrounding 
towns and countryside."
(Bracknell DC Report, 1965)*
2. See the evidence in Thomas (1969) Chapter 3, that
the London new towns have improved in ease of access 
to employment opportunities, as measured by the 
apparent need for commuting, while comparable normal 
towns have shown deterioration. Hence "What the 
new towns have done is to demonstrate the feasibilities 
of the policy of moving work and homes out in step.
The same policy could be applied ... to other major 
employment centres in the South-East."
(Hall, 1973, page 346).
Mew Town Machinery and Urban Redevelopment
Much of the evidence submitted to the Expenditure Committee 
concerned the applicability of new town machinery to inner-city 
redevelopment: the specific example of London's Dockland was used 
by the RTPI to illustrate a situation in which one, or several, local 
authorities faced a whole complex of interrelated problems, requiring 
sophisticated co-ordination of agencies. The Town and Country Planning 
Association discussed areas of multiple deprivation in inner cities 
in similar terms. Both concluded that centrally-appointed agencies 
were inappropriate, but that there could be advantages in giving 
development corporation-type powers to local authorities, singly or 
in consortia. As already noted, the Government's land proposals go 
far in this direction (for example in the Docklands case local 
authorities will be able to purchase land net of "hope value").
The TCPA added the proviso that local authorities would have to prove 
more capable of meeting real needs of people, and suggested the forma­
tion of "Special Area Management Committees". The combination of cheap 
land assembly powers and an area-based corporate approach comes very 
close to locally-sponsored development agencies. The RTPI's suggestion 
of "Special Development Boards" is clearly closely related and the 
West Central Scotland Study illustrates the device being recommended 
for specific application:
"In view of the size of the redevelopment schemes we believe 
that Glasgow Corporation and subsequently the Glasgow 
District Council should consider setting up Development 
Committees to co-ordinate the whole development programme 
in each scheme, including social services shopping and 
other facilities"
(West Central Scotland, 1973, para 7.24)
Despite the wide discussion in committee, no mention is made 
in the English Consultative Document of the adaptations of the new
town machinery which might be used in urban regeneration. It is 
again left to the Scottish Document to indicate that the concept 
is at least within the field of alternatives to be considered:
"The Government have in mind that the talents of these 
teams may have a contribution to make in other fields ... 
that they may perhaps find a new role to play in the 
regeneration of existing urban areas. This is a 
topic which the Government would wish in due course 
to explore further in consultation with the local 
authorities, the development corporations, and, 
prospectively, with the Scottish Development Agency."
(The Scottish New Towns, 1975, para 11)
This is not to say that the problems of English cities will not 
be tackled in this way. The Government is deeply concerned with inner 
city decline, but its programmes at present can only be described 
as varied and experimental. The field is still open. As the Chartered 
Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy observed to the Expenditure 
Committee, the central corporation is a device for Government investment 
of large amounts of money, with some influence over policies pursued.
If the Government is intent on serious investment in inner area rehabili 
tation, it may force local authorities to accept "partnership" develop­
ment corporations as the price of financial help. The recent moves 
in the housing field (April 1975) show that the Government is prepared 
to take a more interventionary approach to local government affairs. 
General shortage of resources and the success of other partnerships 
arrangements will tend to encourage partnerships in city situations, 
and encourage local authorities to swallow their principles and co­
operate in them.
The Town and Country Planning Association called urban renewal 
the "missing half" of overspill policy, and it is true that much of 
the social imbalance created by past (planned and unplanned) overspill 
is due to the inability of planning in the cities to match the success 
elsewhere - most notably in the new towns. It is quite logical, then,
to seek' to apply the lessons of the new towns to city situations, and 
the scope for using the understanding, and the machinery, of develop­
ment corporations is probably very substantial. This is true whether 
"partnerships" are organised or not. But candid admission of the 
failings of local government is not politically expedient, and this 
may account for the "low profile" adopted in the English (but not 
Scottish) Consultative Document.
Financial Arrangements
Neither Consultative Document is explicit in discussing the 
terms on which new town assets will be transferred to local authority 
assets, but the principles involved in the distribution of betterment 
between the two representatives of "the community" - i.e. central 
and local government is the same for new towns and general development 
alike. Thus, the terms set for distribution of benefits under the
Government's land proposals will serve as a guide to the distribution
which will be sought when new town assets are transferred or disposed.
The terms must emerge soon, but meanwhile the thinking of the Government
appears to be:
"The community in general, i.e. the taxpayer, will have 
made a contribution towards the acquisition of land 
and the Government propose therefore that the benefits 
from the scheme should be shared between local and 
central government. The major part of the benefit
will accrue to the taxpayer in general through the
Exchequer; but a part will remain with the local
community and a part will be distributed amongst
local authorities to help equalise the benefits
of the scheme between ratepayers at large ... It 
must be recognised that because of the timelag 
between acquisition and disposal it will be some 
time before benefits accrue generally."
(Land, Cmnd 5730, 1974, para 59)
New town development is more complex, involving central and 
local provision of services ahead of demand (and rate revenue), but
the Government has indicated that "The sharing of benefits must take 
all such aspects fairly into account (New Towns in England and Wales, 
1974, para 3*5) • This approach must help in easing the way for 
partnership towns, and new town development generally. Moreover, 
if financial provisions for development within the framework of a 
central development corporation and "private enterprise" local authority 
development are congruent (as they should be), then new partners hips 
should be entered into more readily - the intention of the Government - 
since local authorities that they will gain nothing by "going it alone". 
The bitterness of local authorities1 feelings that assets which they 
had made financial sacrifices for, and helped to create, falling 
permanently to the Commission for the New Towns, should at least be 
alleviated.
The formalisation of the financial arrangements may also be the 
opportunity to tackle the distribution of benefits between exporting
and receiving areas. The creation of development value in one place
partly involves the extinguishing of it ±1 another. However, one of 
the difficulties of exporting areas was that no provision was made 
for meeting the cost of extinguishing the value - by elimination of 
former use, which necessitated compensation. So it was that Birmingham 
could not eliminate industrial congestion, because as firms emigrated, 
new firms moved in or expanded to take their place. Similarly, London 
Boroughs often found that they paid towards the housing of people 
in new or expanded towns but did not get the benefit of reduced 
congestion or housing lists, because new residents re-occupied the 
vacated property (perhaps at several removes). In both cases, nothing 
could be done without buying out the land uses concerned. This cost
was clearly a cost of new development and should have been set against
the development value created in the expanded communities.
Theoretically it should be possible to balance betterment and
and compensation at every stage, but this is not practical. But 
there is a clear case for a rolling programme, by which the realised 
benefits of mature new and expanded settlements are directed at 
meeting the costs of extinguishing development values in towns which 
are being redeveloped in pursuit of national policy. It remains to 
be seen whether the rack-renting of commercial and industrial prosperity 
and the Government's intention to give the national community the bulk 
of the increased development values, is adequate to finance the logical 
transfer involved.
Conclusion
New towns have become progressively more integrated with existing 
settlements and the rest of the planning machinery. Reform of 
government, the planning system and the system of ownership of develop­
ment values is likely to further foster integration. Physical detach­
ment as a policy is in decline, because of the decline of the intellectual 
ideal of the self-sufficient civic unit, the falling expectation of 
population, economic and industrial growth, and dissatisfaction with 
the prospects for helping the least well off through a policy of 
long-distance dispersion.
The traditional combination of autonomous development corporations 
developing distinct settlements is not likely to be repeated. Where 
development of a non-local nature is required (for overspill, or in 
support of strategic growth), centrally-appointed development 
corporations will be used, but in formal partnership agreements with 
local authorities. These may concern single large cities, or larger 
areas within which the degree of urbanisation will be intensified.
There will be a formal procedure of negotiation with the authorities 
concerned before designation, to work out the respective areas of
administration. Particular attention will be paid to integration 
of housing policies. There may be division of responsibilities along 
departmental lines, there will certainly be close professional 
collaboration. Such arrangements may be developed in existing new ^  
towns.
Co-operation will be encouraged by the fact that new toms 
will be asked to see that their plans do not unnecessarily conflict 
with local authorities* structure plans.
The operation of the projected land policy v/ill reduce the 
administrative and financial differences between official new towns and 
all other authorities. These authorities wall find that successful 
use of their new powers involves organising themselves along corporate 
lines, and planning more comprehensively. New towns have demonstrated 
how this can be achieved, and local authorities may find it worthwhile 
to adopt the development agency administrative device for their own 
intra-regional planning purposes.
In Scotland this development has already been suggested as 
realistic by the Government, and it fits more easily into the regional 
framework of the new local authority structure. In England, the present 
co-operation of planning authorities at regional and sub-regional 
levels is encouraging, and the fact that several authorities are 
involved at structure plan level may indeed encourage the setting up 
of local development agencies in furtherance of agreed strategic 
objectives.
In overspill new towns, greater emphasis will be placed on 
ensuring that a more representative cross-section of the urban popu­
lation is absorbed - more unskilled people, more old people and so on. 
Friction between old and new towns will also be relieved by adjustments 
in the rate support grant to allow for the diseconomies of population 
decline and presence of disadvantaged groups.
Redevelopment within urban areas will be facilitated by the 
operation of the land policy, and probably by an increase in resources 
directed at urban regeneration. But local authorities will have to 
display great skill in combining all aspects of redevelopment efficiently 
and quickly: this task will be complicated by the presence of several 
tiers of local government. Authorities will be wise to co-operate 
in formal corporate planning agreements, and they may use the device 
of the development corporation sponsored jointly, as the means of 
expediting development and removing it slightly from direct political t 
control, with its unsuitably short time-horizon. Where central govern­
ment injects larg e amounts of resources (especially on an area basis), 
it may encourage partnership corporations with an element of formal 
government influence. It may require the setting up of a development 
agency as the price of its financial involvement, but agencies sponsored 
only by central government will not be introduced to replace local 
authorities entirely.
At a more modest level, application of locally-sponsored agencies 
to speficic tasks, such as regional environmental improvement, house 
rehabilitation, provision of industrial sites can be expected.
In the immediate future, housing assets will be transferred 
gradually from the Commission for the New Towns to local authorities. 
There may be some attempt to ensure that houses remain available for 
incoming workers. In the present and future new towns, the close 
co-operation of corporations and local authorities in the field of 
house rents and letting policy will form the basis for agreed terms 
of transfer. As to unfair manipulation of rents etc. by new town 
local authorities, the present level of central government supervision 
of housing policy is likely to be maintained, and may be intensified 
(regardless of party politics) if economic conditions in the public 
sector worsen.
In Scotland, only houses in East Kilbride and Cumbernauld 
are likely to be transferred in the immediate future, although transfer 
of neighbourhoods in other new toms may take place, depending on the 
degree of co-operation in housing policies achieved. If local housing 
authorities prove unwilling to service industrial development, the 
role of the Special Scottish Housing Association (which in a sense 
is a centrally-sponsored housing agency whose "designated area" is 
all of Scotland) will be strengthened. There may be friction between 
regional authorities and district (housing) authorities, over provision 
of housing to service industrial growth, but durect intervention by 
regional authorities is not likely.
Virtually all the anticipated policies represent promising 
adaptations of the planning machinery pioneered in 1946. Its appli­
cation then was restricted unnecessarily by the unjustified insistence 
on a detached, autonomous type of development, and by the political 
impossibility of the imposition of centrally-appointed agencies on 
the local authority system on a wide enough scale to be significant.
The first restrictive condition has long lost its force, and the 
question is now whether the second can be circumvented by the ability 
of local authorities to integrate the valuable aspects of the new 
towns' professional and administrative abilities into their own 
framework.
There is, in short, the possibility of freeing the new town 
approach from thejhysical and administrative limitations of the t/^ 
centrally-administered designated area, and adapting it for closer 
integration with the wider practice of planning*
If the adaptations are applied with understanding, and the basic 
reasons for the new towns' success in combining quality of environment 
and access to opportunity grasped, then we will be well set to raise
the quality of planning as a whole to the level attained in the new 
towns. Clearly the new tovm experiment (for that is what it proved 
to he) was carried out in favourable circumstances: new towns did 
tend to work with the more socially and economically tractable groups 
in society, and they may have more than their "fair share" of resources. 
But their success is substantial enough to be a fair challenge for 
others to equal.
The question is given special urgency by the Government's 
land proposals, which are designed to put planning as a whole on the 
same footing as that in new toms, so far as powers are concerned.
In a sense planning is on trial, for there is widespread cynicism 
about the ability of local authorities to cope creatively with the 
new powers, and turn "positive planning" from a slogan into reality.
The experience of new town planning and administration has much 
to offer in the effort to avoid the demoralising failure of another 
great planning initiative.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
ABERCROMBIE, P. Greater London Plan, 1944* H.M.S.O., London, 1945. 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR LONDON REGIONAL PLANNING. Report to the 
Minister of Town and Country Planning. H.M.S.O. 1946.
BARLOW REPORT. (Royal Commission on the Distribution of the Industrial 
Population), Cmnd 6153» H.M.S.O. London, 1940.
BRACKNELL. Development Corporation Annual Report 1956, HC 110, 1966-67* 
BULL, D. A. New Towns and Town Expansion Schemes: Government Planning 
Reports. Town Planning Review. Vol. 38.2, July 1967.
CAMERON, G. C. Growth Areas, Growth Centres and Regional Conversion.
Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 1970.
CAMERON, G. C. and REID, G. L. Scottish Economic Planning and the 
Attraction of Industry. Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh, 1966. 
CHAMBERLAIN REPORT. Departmental Committee on the Principles to 
-be followed in Dealing with the Unhealthy Areas. H.M.S.O.
London, 1921.
CULLINGWORTH, J. B. Some Effects of Planned Overspill. The East
Ham Study, Journal of the Town Planning Institute, Dec. 1959* 
CULLINGWORTH, J. B. Some Administrative Problems of Planned Overspill: 
The Selection of Tenants for the New and Expanded Towns for 
London. Public Administration, Winter 1959»
CULLINGWORTH, J. B. English Housing Trends, Bell, London, 1965* 
CULLINGWORTH, J. B. The Ownership and Management of Housing in the 
New Towns, H.M.S.O. London 1967*
DEAKIN, N., UNGERSON, C. Town and Country Planning, January 1974. 
DEPARTMENT OP THE ENVIRONMENT• Land. London, H.M.S.O. 1974.
DIAMOND, D. New Towns in their Regional Context, in Hazel Evans (ed.) 
New Towns: the British Experience, 1972.
EUROPEAN PRES TRADE ASSOCIATION. Regional Policy in EFTA - the Growth 
Centre Idea. 3FTA, Geneva, 1968.
EVERSLEY, D. E. C. The Wythall Inquiry - A Planning-Political Post­
script. _iii The Wythall Inquiry. Ed. J. R. Long, London, I960. 
Estates Gazette.
EVERSLEY, D. Pour Outdated Assumptions. Built Environment,
September 1974, pp* 452-5*
FORSTER, E. M. The Challenge of Our Time in Two Cheers for Democracy, 
Penguin, London, 1965*
GEE, P. A. Homes and Jobs for Londoners in New and Expanded Towns.
H.M.S.O. 1972.
GREATER LONDON PLAN. Memorandum by the Minister of Town and Country 
Planning, London. H.M.S.O. 1974*
HALL, P. The Pattern of Cities to Come. New Society, 10th March 
1966.
HALL, P. Containment of Urban England, Vol. II. George Allen and 
Unwin, 1973*
HANSARD. Vol. 421, May 1946. H.M.S.O., London, 1946.
HERAUD. B. J. New Towns and London’s Housing Problem. Urban Studies.
Feb. 1966.
HERAUD, B. J. Social Class and the New Towns. Urban Studies 5*1#
February 1968,
HOUSING (ADDITIONAL POWERS) ACT 1919* 9 and 10 Geo. V, Ch. 99, Section 10
HOWARD, E. Garden Cities of To-morrow. 1902, London. Faber 1965* London
IRETON, P. T. and McCOMB, J. E. Future Ownership of the New Toms.
Town and Country Planning, Jan. 1956,
JOHNSON, R. "New Town” and "Expanded Tom" Development. 1973, Glasgow.
Unpublished M.Phil thesis.
LONG, J. R. (ed.) The Wythall Inquiry. I960, London, Estates Gazette.
LUTTRELL, W. F. "Groxith of Industry" in Hazel Evans (ed.) 1972,
New Toxms; the British Experience.
MANN, P. The Socially Balanced Neighbourhood Unit. 1958. Town 
Planning Review, Job 24, July, pp. 91-98.
HARLEY COMMITTEE (Departmental Committee on Garden Cities and 
Satellite Toxms). Report. London, H.M.S.O. 1935.
MERCER, G. Speke as a New Town. Toxm Planning Reviex*, 1953* Oct. 
215-238.
HSYERSON, M. and BANFIELD, E. C. Politics, Planning and the Public 
Interest. The Free Press, Glencoe. 1965*
MINISTRY OF HOUSING AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT. Memorandum on the Town 
Development Act. H.M.S.O. London, 1952.
MINISTRY OF HOUSING AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT. Selection of Tenants.
Circular 29/1953. H.M.S.O. London 1953.
MINISTRY OF HOUSING AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT. Green Belts: Circular 
42/1955. H.M.S.O. London, 1955.
MINISTRY OF HOUSING AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT• Green Belts. Circular 
50/1957. H.M.S.O. London. 1957.
MINISTRY OF TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING. Selection of Tenants:
Circular 12/49. H.M.S.O. London 1949.
MINISTRY OF TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING. Town and Country Planning 
1943-51. Cmnd. 8204. H.M.S.O. London 1952.
MUMFORD, L. The Garden City Idea and Modern Planning, in Howard 
"Garden Cities of To-morrow” Faber and Faber, London, 1965.
THE NORTH EAST. A Programme for Regional Development and Growth.
H.M.S.O. 1963, Cmnd. 2206.
NORTHAMPTON DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION. 2nd Annual Report 1969-70 HC 64
NORTHAMPTON DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION. 3rd Annual Report 1970-71 HC 550
NORTHAMPTON DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, 4th Annual Report 1971-72 HC 453
NEW TOWNS. Expenditure Committee, Environment and Home Office 
Sub-Committee. H.M.S.O. 1973-74•
H.C. 18 i Dept, of Environment Memoranda and Evidence
ii Dept, of Environment - continued, 
iii Town and Country Planning Association. 
Memorandum and Evidence, 
iv Association of New Town Local Authorities 
Memorandum and Evidence, 
v New Towns Association.
Memorandum and Evidence, 
vi Town and Country Planning Association continued, 
vii Royal Town Planning Institute.
Memorandum and Evidence, 
viii Commission for the New Towns.
Memorandum and Evidence.
Chartered Institute of Public Finance 
and Accountancy.
Memorandum and Evidence, 
ix Department of Trade and Industry.
Memoranda and Evidence, 
x London Boroughs Association.
Memorandum and Evidence.
NSW TOWNS ACT, 1946. H.M.S.O., London, 1946.
NEW TOWNS ACT, 1958. H.M.S.O., London, 1958.
NEW TOWNS ACT, 1959. H.M.S.O., London, 1959.
NEW TOWNS ACT, 1965. H.M.S.O., London, 1965.
NEW TOWNS (RE1TH) COMMITTEE. Ministry of Town and Country Planning.
Interim Report Cmnd 6759 
Second Interim Report Cmnd 6794 
Final Report, Cmnd 6876.
London, H.M.S.O., 1946 
NEW TOWNS IN ENGLAND AND WALES., A Consultation Document.
Department of the Environment, London, 1974.
OGILVY, A. A. The Self-Contained New Town. Vol. 39*1 April 1969 
Toxm Planning Review.
OSBORN, F. J. Dispersal: A Call for Action. Mr. Sandy's Opportunity.
Town and Country Planning, spril, 1955.
OSBORN, F. J. Parliament and Planning. Toxm and Country Planning, 
May, 1955.
OSBORN, F. J. Preface to "Garden Cities of To-Morrow"
Faber and Faber, London, 1965*
OSBORN, F. J. Green Belt Cities. Evelyn, Adams and Kackay.
London, 1069*
OSBORN, F. J. and WHITTICK. New Towns: the Answer to Megalopolis.
London, Hill, 1969.
PETERBOROUGH DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
1st Annual Report 1968-69 H.C. 398
2nd " *» 1969-70 H.C. 64
3rd " " 1970-71 H.C. 550
4th " " 1971-72 H.C. 453
5th " ” 1972-73 H.C. 403
6th " " 1973-74 H.C. 317
PRESTHUS, R. V. Note on British Town Planning Co-ordination.
Journal of Politics, 1952.
PURDOM, C. B. The Letchworth Achievement. London, Dent, 1963.
REITH, J. C. W. An Essay In Civilisation. Britain Today, 1946, London.
REITH, J. C. W. Into the Wind. Collins, London, 1946.
ROD'WIN, L. The British New Towns Policy - Problems and Implications.
Harvard U.P. Cambridge, Mass. 1956.
SCHAFFER, F. The New Town Story. McGibbon and Kee, London, 1970.
SCHAFFER, F. The New Town Movement, in Hazel Evans (ed.) 1972
"New Towns: the British Experience.
SCOTTISH DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT• CENTRAL Scotland: Development and
Growth. Cmnd. 2188, H.M.S.O. 1963*
SCOTTISH DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT. Lothians Regional Survey and Plan.
H.M.S.O. Edinburgh 1966.
THE SCOTTISH NEW TOWNS. A Consultation Document. Scottish Office,
Edinburgh, 1975.
SELF, P. The New Towns Industrial Boom. Town and Country Planning, 
January, 1955.
SELF, P. The Green Belt Idea. Introduction to The Wythall Inquiry, 
ed. Joyce R. Lord. London, Estates Gazette Ltd. I960.
SELF, P. TCPA Evidence to the Hunt Committee. Toxm and Country 
Planning, Vol. 36, no. 5.
SELF, P. New Towns in-the Modern World. Intro, to New Towns,the British 
Experience, ed. Hazel Evans, Charles Knight, London, 1972.
SHARP, Dame E. The Government Role, in Hazel Evans (ed.) 1972.
New Towns: the British Experience.
SMITH, H. R. Dispersal of Population from Congested Urban Areas 
in Scotland. Public Administration, Summer 1956.
SHOUT, T. C. The Londoner and the Planned Village in Scotland, in 
Mitchison and Phillipson. Scotland in the Age of Improvement. 
Edinburgh University Press, 1969.
THE SOUTH EAST STUDY 1961-81. Ministry of Housing and Local 
Government. H.M.S.O. London, 1964*
STRANZ, W. Overspill - Anticipation and Reality. University of
Birmingham, Centre for Urban and Regional Studies. Birmingham,
1972.
STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE NORTH WEST. SPNW Joint Planning Team.
H.M.S.O. London 1973*
TAYLOR, A. J. P. English History 1914-1945. Oxford U.P. 1965» Oxford.
TELLING. A. E. The Act in Brief Town and Country Planning,
August, 1954*
THOMS, R. Aycliffe to Cumbernauld. A Study of Seven New Toxms in
their Regions. PEP Broadsheet 516, London, December 1969.
THOMAS, R. "London's New Toxms” PEP, London 1969*
THOMAS, W. The Management Task, in Hazel Evans, 1972, New Towns:
the British Experience.
128.
TOOTHILL REPORT, (inquiry into the Scottish Economy 1960-61)
Scottish Council (Development and Industry). Edinburgh, 1961.
TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING (Journal)
June 1936 ) n ... . n
e j. inic. \ Editorials Sept 1936 )
TOWN DEVELOPMENT ACT, 1952. H.M.S.O. London, 1952.
TOWN PLANNING ACT, 1925. Section 16.
TOWN PLANNING (SCOTLAND) ACT, 1925. Section 15.
TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING ACT, 1932. Section 35.
TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING (SCOTLAND) ACT, 1932. Section 34.
WAIDE, L. Expanded Towns: the Background. Built Environment,
March 1973, pp. 136-138.
WELLS, Sir H. Agencies and Finance, in Hazel Evans (ed.) 1972
New Towns: the British Experience.
WEST CENTRAL SCOTLAND PLAN Consultative Draft Report. Glasgow, 1974.
also Supplementary Volume 1, The Regional Economy.
WHEATLEY COMMISSION (Royal Commission on Local Government in Scotland)
Report. Cmnd 4150. H.M.S.O. Edinburgh 1969*
Written Evidence Vol. 5 Regional Studies Association
Vol. 8 SSHA
New Town Development Corporations.
Vol. 22 East Kilbride Town Council.
WILCOX, D. "But Who Will Initiate?" Built Environment, March 1975.
WILSON, T. Policies for Regional Development, Oliver and Boyd,
Edinburgh, 1964.




Since writing, some of the possibilities for the future outlined 
in the final chapter have emerged as firm suggestions to the Department, 
of the Environment by Northampton County Council^, in response to 
the Governments Consultative Document.
They argue that development pressures are being misdirected in 
the county. Daventry and Corby have spare capacity, yet expensive 
infrastructure is required to service proposed developments at 
Northampton, for example. Accordingly, to ensure more rational 
direction of growth pressures:
"... they propose that in Northamptonshire the existing 
agreements - particularly those under the New Town 
Development Act -should be renegotiated and the 
possibility of two development corporations for the 
whole county be discussed."
There is a strong suggestion that to ensure representation of 
local views, direct local government nomination of a majority of 
corporation members should be negotiated, but since the issue is 
not raised, the council appears to accept that the development 
corporation agency remains the best way of co-ordinating development 
in the interests of all.
(The Observation Document1) ".. stresses the impossibility 
of seeing New Towns in isolation from neighbouring areas, 
and refers to the need for all country development to 
be co-ordinated. While acknowledging the achievements 
of new and expanded towns, the county feels that the time 
is opportune for more effective arrangements to cope 
with expansion. This is particularly evident as there
1• See Gillard, R "Northampton put Forward New Town Master Plan" 
Public Service and Local Government Appointments,
7th April 1975, page 10.
appear to be potentially serious conflicts over the 
master plans of the single-minded development agencies 
and the county's proposed structure plan.”
Finally, the emergent issue of distribution of development 
values is tentatively aired - and again the tacit assumption that 
resolution of differences can most easily be achieved by adapting 
the valuable development agency machinery, not be eliminating it:
"We also feel that the local authority should share in the 
development carried out by the Development Corporation - 
so that if there is a financial return through the land 
assembly operation ••• the local authority should 
participate in these profits."
What is interesting is that the assumption of development cor­
poration-type powers by local authorities in pursuit of regional plan 
was a possibility floated in the Scottish Consultation Document alone 
(The Scottish New Towns, 1975, para 12). The fact that a county 
x^ ith experience of partnership agreements on a smaller scale should 
independently generate the novel concept is perhaps an indication 
that it is worth serious consideration.
